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DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY: INFERRING
SPECIFIC CAUSATION IN THE LAW FROM
GROUP DATA IN SCIENCE
Joseph Sanders,* David L. Faigman,** Peter B. Imrey,*** and
Philip Dawid****

In every toxic-tort case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant exposed the
plaintiff to something that caused an injury. The causal proof is in two parts: proof
of general causation and proof of specific causation. General causation addresses
the question of whether the exposure can cause injury in anyone. In the area of toxic
torts, the evidence available to answer this question comes in the form of groupbased studies in the fields of toxicology, epidemiology, and genetics—studies that
search for the effects of causes.
Proof of general causation, however, is not enough. Because court cases focus on
the individual, the plaintiff must prove specific causation. The plaintiff must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the exposure—and not something else—
caused the plaintiff’s harm. This typically is done through expert “differential
etiology” testimony. This testimony is not focused on the search for the effects of
causes but rather for the causes of effects.
Unfortunately, there is no body of science to which experts can turn when
addressing this issue. Ultimately, much of the evidence that can be brought to bear
on this causal question is the same group-level data employed to prove general
causation. Consequently, the expert testimony often feels jerry-rigged, an
improvisation designed to get through a tough patch. Court opinions that rule on
the admissibility of this testimony rarely offer any systematic guidance about what
is and is not an adequate differential etiology.
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Too often lawyers and courts have treated differential etiology as a matter of logical
deduction and not as what it actually is: an inferential process combining statistical
reasoning with a conceptual model of the causal interrelationships underlying
observed data. This Article seeks to bring clarity to the differential-etiology
determination by offering a scientifically oriented exposition of differential etiology.
It provides a taxonomy of specific-causation situations and a systematic discussion
of the factors that courts should consider in making a specific-causation
determination. Our goal is to assist lawyers and judges in reasoning from group
data to individual cases, what is referred to in the literature as the G2i problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Off and on for several years, Ms. Jones took the drug Lipitor to control her
blood-cholesterol level.1 Apparently the drug was effective in this regard. During
periods when she did not take the medication, her cholesterol levels rose and then
fell again when she resumed taking the drug. However, several years after she began
taking the drug, she was admitted to the hospital with a high blood-glucose level and
diagnosed with new-onset diabetes.
Ms. Jones sued the manufacturer of Lipitor, claiming the drug caused her
Type 2 diabetes. Plaintiff’s proposed expert, a highly qualified individual with both
an M.D. and a Ph.D. from prestigious universities, was prepared to testify both that
Lipitor can cause diabetes and that Jones’s diabetes was caused by Lipitor. The first
opinion concerns the question of general causation. Can Lipitor cause diabetes? The
second opinion concerns the question of specific causation. Did Lipitor cause Ms.
Jones’s diabetes?2
To answer the first question, Ms. Jones’s expert could draw upon a
potentially wide body of evidence. Scientists typically study groups of individuals
with the general goal being to identify how these groups differ in relation to one or
more variables. Hence, laboratory-based bioscientists might examine whether
Lipitor and other statins cause diabetes in small animals bred for diabetes
susceptibility, and epidemiologists might compare the rates of diabetes in human
populations exposed to statins with others not similarly exposed.
But proof of general causation is not enough to resolve the legal issues. In
the courtroom the focus is ultimately on the individual. The plaintiff must also prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the
substance in question. The plaintiff must find an expert prepared to conduct a

1.
The facts in this introductory example are loosely taken from In re Lipitor
(Atorvastatin Calcium) Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, 150 F.
Supp. 3d 644 (D.S.C. 2015) (relating to Hempstead v. Pfizer, Inc., 2:14-cv-1879). We discuss
this case at greater length below.
2.
The distinction between “general causation” and “specific causation” is
endemic to the science and law intersection and involves what has been termed the “G2i
issue,” or the challenge of reasoning from group data in science to what is typically most
relevant in courts: whether an individual case is an instance of some general phenomenon.
The challenges of G2i are explored in David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014).
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“differential etiology”3—that is, to testify that it is more likely than not her injury
was caused by the substance in question rather than the other possible causes of her
injury.4 In our example, Ms. Jones had a number of other “risk factors” for diabetes.
She was of an age when people experience an increased risk of diabetes, she had a
high body-mass index, one of her parents was diabetic, and she suffered from
hypertension. What then can Ms. Jones’s expert say about whether Lipitor caused
her diabetes? What evidence can the expert bring to bear on this question?
The problem confronting the expert is well known. As we have noted in
several previous articles, when courts turn from ascertaining general causation to
specific causation, they are asked to ascertain not the effects of causes but the causes
of effects.5 However, in many tort cases and other cases of indeterminate causation,
the additional science available to assist in this decision is quite limited, if it exists
at all.6 It is important to understand why this is the case. Practicing scientists tend to
3.
Etiology is the study of causes. In medical usage, it is the study of the cause
or origin of a disease. As discussed infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text, many courts
use the term “differential diagnosis” when they are describing what is better understood as
“differential etiology.” For the sake of clarity, we use “differential etiology” to describe a
method by which the cause of a condition is determined, in contrast to “differential
diagnosis,” which refers most accurately to the method by which the identity of the condition
itself is determined. Hence, for example, the method for determining that the plaintiff suffers
from new-onset diabetes is differential diagnosis; the method for determining that Lipitor
caused that illness is differential etiology.
4.
Most courts have resisted calls for alternatives such as permitting
proportionate recoveries even when the plaintiff fails to meet the preponderance standard.
Under such schemes, if a plaintiff could prove, for example, that her risk increased 25%
because of her exposure to substance X, she could recover 25% of her damages from the
maker of X. For discussions of various ways in which courts might alter causal proofs in mass
exposure cases, see Alessandro Romano, God’s Dice: The Law in a Probabilistic World, 41
U. DAYTON L. REV. 57, 84–86 (2016); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 898–900 (1984); Margaret Berger, Eliminating
General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117 (1997); Margaret Berger & Aaron Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 275–80 (2005); Steve C. Gold, Note, Causation
in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE
L.J. 376, 393–401 (1986). In this Article, our focus is on proof of specific causation, assuming
the current liability regime. We do note that in most of the situations discussed in this Article,
causation must be approached from a probabilistic perspective. See Frederick Schauer &
Barbara Spellman, Probabilistic Causation in the Law, 176 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 4 (2020).
5.
See Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 435; see also David L. Faigman,
Christopher Slobogin & John Monahan, Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of
Scientific Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 888 (2016).
6.
Most of the examples in this Article are taken from the area of what is
commonly called “toxic torts.” In this Article we use “toxic tort” to describe a wide variety
of lawsuits. Included in our use of the term are not only the obvious examples of asbestos and
benzene but also drugs that cause harm to their users. However, we also discuss cases that
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address causal questions by elucidating and modulating the mechanisms that
regularly produce an effect of interest, studying groups in order to control random
variability. They do this much more often than by directly attempting to identify
which, among proposed candidates, was responsible for a particular instance of that
effect.7 Thus, typically, the published scientific evidence to address such a question
of specific causation is the same evidence a court must use to resolve generalcausation questions.
Consequently, the expert testimony often feels jerry-rigged, an
improvisation designed to get through a tough patch.8 Court opinions that rule on
the admissibility9 of this testimony rarely offer any systematic guidance about what
is and what is not an adequate differential etiology. Unfortunately, too often courts
have viewed this inferential process as a matter of logical deduction and not as what
it actually is: an inferential process combining statistical reasoning with a conceptual
model of the causal interrelationships underlying observed data. This Article seeks
to bring clarity to the differential-etiology determination. It provides scientifically
informed guidelines for conducting an adequate differential etiology. As such,

would not generally be classified as toxic torts. For the purposes of this Article, the most
important factor for inclusion is the possibility of multiple causes of the plaintiff’s condition.
The inferential reasoning challenge presented in toxic-tort cases is present in all areas of
scientific evidence that involve reasoning from group data to individual cases, which is
usually the ultimate issue of concern in court. Guns leave identifying marks on bullets, but
the ultimate legal issue in court is whether the marks on the bullet that killed the victim came
from the defendant’s gun. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization
Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 212–13 (2008). Hence, the
challenge of reasoning from general data to the individual case is presented in virtually all
areas in which science is applied in the courtroom. Faigman et al., supra note 2. Toxic torts
are arguably the area in which courts first discovered the disconnect between the general data
of science and the need for individuation in the law.
7.
Epidemiological investigations of disease outbreaks and of the origins of new
diseases and accident investigations of virtually any type are exceptions to this “rule” that fall
in a gray zone between science and application.
8.
One solution to this problem would be to prohibit all specific-causation
testimony and simply leave the issue to the jury. See A. Philip Dawid et al., Fitting Science
into Legal Contexts: Assessing Effects of Causes or Causes of Effects?, 43(3) SOCIO.
METHODS & RSCH. 359, 363–64 (2014).
9.
Our primary focus in this Article is on the federal courts. The current Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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however, these guidelines only direct a court’s discretion; they do not prescribe
outcomes.10
Our primary audiences for this Article are the lawyers and judges who must
manage specific-causation testimony. Following Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., federal courts—and now most state courts—are charged with
evaluating the methods and principles underlying proffered scientific evidence.11
This holding was codified into amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 2000.
Whereas general causation is the subject of volumes of scientific discourse, 12
specific causation is a term largely unknown among scientists. Indeed, the method
of differential etiology that is currently employed to assess specific causation was
invented by lawyers and largely, if inadequately, defined by courts and legal
scholars, not scientists. 13 This Article, then, is the first full-scale effort to bring
scientific sensibilities—and rigorous statistical thinking—to the legally imperative
concept of specific causation.
In Part I we begin with the historical background. We review the confusion
that has surrounded the nature of differential-etiology testimony and the expertise
of those offering it, and show how this confusion has impeded efforts to develop a
systematic approach to understanding and analyzing this testimony. We end this Part
by considering the steps one should take when deciding a toxic-tort case: (a) making
a proper diagnosis; (b) supporting (“ruling in”) the plausibility of the alleged cause
of the injury on the basis of general evidence and logic; and (c) particularization,
i.e., excluding (“ruling out”) competing causes in the specific instance under
consideration.14
Part II discusses problems that arise when trying to obtain a correct
diagnosis of the illness for which a cause is sought. A correct diagnosis is a critical
first step. If a diagnosis is incorrect, all other steps are irrelevant.
Part III discusses the evidence one may use to rule in the alleged cause of
the plaintiff’s injury. This is the general-causation question. What are the effects of
an alleged cause? Although our focus is ultimately on the specific-causation
question, i.e., the causes of a specific effect, this issue cannot be properly addressed
in the absence of an understanding of what evidence is available on the generalcausation issue and the internal- and external-validity problems confronting this
evidence. The last portion of Part III uses the well-known Bradford Hill criteria to

10.
The primary focus of this Article is to provide a road map to specific-causation
decisions. But, in doing so we also address the current state of judicial evaluation of
differential-etiology testimony.
11.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 1 (West 2019–2020 ed.).
12.
Dawid et al., supra note 8, at 360.
13.
David L. Faigman & Claire Lesikar, Organized Common Sense: Some Lessons
from Judge Jack Weinstein’s Uncommonly Sensible Approach to Scientific Evidence, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 439–40 (2015).
14.
Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 180 (6th Cir. 2009).
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clarify how the different types of evidence available in these cases address or fail to
address internal- and external-validity threats.15
Part IV turns to specific causation. Building on the discussion in Part III, it
organizes specific-causation cases based on the evidence available to include the
putative cause and to exclude other competing causes of a plaintiff’s condition. The
empirical task is always to assess the strength of the evidence supporting the asserted
cause against the strength of the evidence supporting all competing causes. Our goal
is to provide a taxonomy of specific-causation situations and provide a systematic
discussion of the factors that courts should consider in making a specific-causation
determination. As we shall see, the evidence for specific causation is often the same
evidence used to assess general causation. Therefore, although the Bradford Hill
guidelines were originally put forth as indicia by which to establish general
causation, together with close evaluation of validity, they may also assist the effort
to evaluate specific causation.
Part V considers the complementary roles of science and policy in guiding
admissibility decisions. The approach set forth in Part V can help courts to
understand and articulate the grounds on which they admit or exclude expert
evidence. It is important to state, however, that they cannot establish a fixed standard
for admissibility. The standard is, or at least should be, grounded in science;
however, it is also influenced by policy considerations. These considerations
influence how much scientific support a specific-causation opinion should have
before it is admitted into testimony. In Part V we acknowledge this fact. We do not
attempt to take sides on how much evidence is needed, but we do urge courts to do
their best to always explain their decisions using the approach developed in Part V.
This Article closes with a brief conclusion.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The terminology used to describe the process of establishing specific
causation has been clouded by ambiguity. Courts frequently describe this as a
process of “differential diagnosis.” Differential diagnosis has a well-understood
meaning in medicine. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines the term as “the
determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one
from which the patient is suffering by a systematic comparison and contrasting of
the clinical findings.”16 In other words, it is a process by which physicians determine
the patient’s condition, not the cause of that condition.
It is important to understand that the causal analysis associated with a
diagnosis has itself changed over time and, indeed, may change with respect to a
given disease as our understanding of that disease improves. Clinical diagnosis
originated as a simple recognition and labeling of patterns of symptoms and signs.
Causal concepts such as humours, miasmas, and spirits were vague, pre-scientific,
and of little utility for prevention. However, since the discovery of microbes and
revolutions in biochemistry and genetics, mechanistic concepts have worked their

15.
Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MEDICINE 295 (1965).
16.
Differential Diagnosis, STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
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way into disease definitions. 17 Nowadays, diagnosis of an infectious disease
typically relies not only on characteristic symptoms and signs of illness but also on
identifying a microorganism, a uniquely associated antigen, or minimally,
antibodies that establish that the organism is or was present.18 Identifying a cancer
depends on observations at the histological, cellular, and sometimes genetic levels.
But these mechanisms that now determine the diagnosis are actually preceding
causes of the signs and symptoms of which diagnoses used to be entirely constituted.
So it is somewhat natural that, as the concept of diagnosis has moved from pure
cross-sectional observation without any time dimension to identification of
preceding active mechanisms these signs and symptoms ultimately manifest, the
terminology of purely cross-sectional labeling has persisted.
Consider how the definition of AIDS has evolved, from labeling of a
bewildering, unexplained clinical syndrome or syndromes initially, to a disease
defined by low prevalence of CD4 cells or onset of one of a set of more specific
diseases preceded or accompanied by identification of human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) using antigen, antibody, or RNA tests.19 So, HIV infection has been
clearly identified as the cause of AIDS and is now inextricably part of the meaning
of that diagnosis. Diagnosis has become more etiologic.
Consider another example where the two tasks overlap. In the process of
diagnosing a patient’s ailment, allergists routinely search for the cause of an
individual’s allergy by exposing the individual to various substances and observing
the results. In this and similar situations, the difference between diagnosis and
etiology shrinks.
Even in this evolving environment, however, one important difference
remains between the physician’s task and the law’s objective. In most clinical
situations, the physician wants to understand the causal mechanisms producing an
ailment only to the point of being able to prescribe a course of treatment (or to
determine that there is no available treatment). Usually, a full understanding of
background causes is not necessary to achieve this objective.20 But it is these very
background causes that are of interest to the legal system when it conducts a
differential etiology. To return to the AIDS example, in a legal context when one
17.
See generally ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND : A
MEDICAL HISTORY OF HUMANITY (1997); STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP: THE STORY OF
LONDON’S MOST TERRIFYING EPIDEMIC—AND HOW IT CHANGED SCIENCE, CITIES, AND THE
MODERN WORLD (2006).
18.
See CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES MANUAL (David L. Heymann ed.,
20th ed. 2014).
19.
ROGER C. HERDMAN & CLYDE J. BEHNEY, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE
CDC’S CASE DEFINITION OF AIDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED REVISIONS II 53–II 56
(1992), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9206.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB8U-UJQY]; OFF. OF AIDS
RSCH., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GLOSSARY OF HIV/AIDS-RELATED TERMS 2 (9th
ed. 2021) https://clinicalinfo.hiv.gov/sites/default/files/glossary/Glossary-English_HIVinfo.
pdf [https://perma.cc/P4G2-5SPZ].
20.
We have chosen to use the term “background causes” to describe the causes
of interest to the law. Often, but not always, they are distal rather than proximal causes, but
they share in common that many are causes that are relevant to the legal task of attributing
responsibility.
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asks about the cause of a patient’s disease, it may often be taken for granted that
what is meant is not HIV itself but the cause of the patient’s HIV infection, be that
one type or another of sexual contact, illicit drug injection, contaminated blood
transfusion, or other inadvertent exposure of someone during the health-care
process.
There are important exceptions to this general position. For example, as we
discuss below, a physician’s search for a genetic cause of an ailment may be a search
for the same background causal explanation that is of interest to the law. In most
cases, however, the causal analysis of interest to the law is not one that physicians
are trained to perform.
Beginning at least as early as the 1940s, courts used the term “differential
diagnosis” to describe the diagnostic process.21 It is difficult to determine when the
term “differential diagnosis” first appeared in legal opinions to describe the
background cause that explains the plaintiff’s disease. Candidates can be found as
early as the mid-1960s,22 but clear use of the term in this way does not arise prior to
the 1980s.
The earliest cases involved vaccines. 23 For example, in Grill v. United
States, Judge Pratt noted that the plaintiff’s expert had relied on a differential
diagnosis which “ruled out other possible causes” in support of his conclusion that
the likelihood that the plaintiff’s “optic neuritis was caused by the swine flu vaccine
exceeds ninety percent.” 24
This usage escaped the bounds of the vaccine cases with the rise of toxic
torts and the increasingly frequent challenges to the admissibility of the plaintiff’s
expert opinions in the early 1990s.25 The number of cases steadily grew following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert opinion.
Early cases and, to a lesser extent, cases still today exhibit three
shortcomings in their approach. First, the courts failed to distinguish between
differential diagnosis as it is understood in the medical field and the search for the
legally relevant background cause of an illness. Second, because of this confusion,
the courts failed to recognize that expertise in arriving at a correct diagnosis does
not necessarily transfer to expertise in assigning causes to illnesses. And third,
perhaps in part because of these two confusions, courts failed to develop a coherent,
explicit “standard technique” one should follow when one attempts to answer the
background causal question.

21.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Harmegnies, 110 F.2d 20, 26
(8th Cir. 1940). Most cases that use the term in this way are medical-malpractice claims based
on the allegation that the physician failed to properly diagnose the plaintiff’s illness.
22.
See Martin v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 183 So. 2d 769 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
23.
E.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 533 F.Supp. 703, 710
(D. Utah 1982).
24.
552 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The court ultimately excluded this
testimony, finding that it was based on little more than temporal proximity between the
vaccine and the onset of symptoms.
25.
See Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 755 (3d Cir. 1994).
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In the ensuing years, many, but not all, courts have exhibited a greater
appreciation of the first and second mistake, but courts have made relatively little
progress in developing a systematic analytical approach. Before we turn to such an
approach, however, it is worthwhile to say a bit more about how the first two
misunderstandings have impeded the courts’ ability to deal with the third failure.
A. Recognizing that Differential Etiology and Differential Diagnosis are Different
Endeavors
In the 1995 case of McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.,26 the court used the term
“differential etiology” for what appears to be its first recorded use. Although the
McCullock court did not appear to appreciate the significance of this change in
phraseology, differential etiology is a better choice than differential diagnosis
because it contemplates the study of causes or origins. Although many courts now
distinguish between differential diagnosis and differential etiology,27 some continue
to confuse the two terms.28
At one level, using the term “differential diagnosis” to identify specific
causation is only semantic. However, at another level the confusion can mislead
courts into believing that physicians are always well trained in this process. In this
Article we refer to the process of determining specific causation as “differential
etiology.”
B. Recognizing that Expertise in Assigning Illnesses to Symptoms Does Not
Transfer to Expertise in Assigning Causes to Illnesses
The use of the term “differential diagnosis” to mean the search for the
background cause of an illness has led some courts to begin their analysis of a
specific-causation expert with an assertion that this “method” is widely accepted and
practiced by physicians.29 An aura of validity and general acceptance over anything
going by that name causes courts to be less critical than they might be if they
recognized that skill and experience in diagnosing an illness does not always
translate to skill and experience in attributing background causation. 30 For most
physicians, attributing background causation is not part of their normal practice.31
26.
61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).
27.
See, e.g., McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (11th Cir.
2005); Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d. 1183, 1195 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2010). See
generally Anthony G. Hopp et al., Differential Diagnosis and Daubert: Preventing the Misuse
of Differential Etiology to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1 (2017).
28.
See, for example, the definition offered by the court in Glastetter v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 2000). “Differential diagnosis
is a patient-specific process of elimination that medical practitioners use to identify the ‘most
likely’ cause of a set of signs and symptoms from a list of possible causes.” Lennon v. Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
29.
See Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4th Cir. 1995); John’s
Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1036 (Alaska 2002); Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v.
Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 107 (Ky. 2008).
30.
See Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 1991); Ervin v.
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2006 WL 1529582, at *4–5 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2006).
31.
Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in Translation: Statistical Inference in Court, 46
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (2014); see also Dawid et al., supra note 8, at 367.
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Distinguishing etiology from diagnosis ensures that courts do not assume that all
physicians are trained to engage in a differential etiology or that this is part of their
routine practice.32
Bowers v. Norfolk Southern Corp. 33 illustrates another important
difference. Judge Royal begins by distinguishing between traditional diagnoses and
establishing the background cause of a disease, and he then focuses his attention on
the consequences of a mistaken diagnosis versus a mistaken courtroom etiology. A
missed or mistaken diagnosis may lead to a patient’s death and, as a result in some
cases, a malpractice suit. 34 Even when there is no question of malpractice, a
misdiagnosis presumably leads to an ineffective treatment, causing the physician to
reconsider the original diagnosis. That is, there is a natural self-correcting feedback
loop that assists physicians in the process of abandoning incorrect diagnoses.
Because of this feedback loop, physicians, through long experience in making
diagnoses, may well become experts in that process.35 There is no such feedback
loop for differential-etiology testimony in court. Moreover, the expert witness has
little at stake. The plaintiff is at no risk of harm beyond the loss of the case, and the
expert will not be sued for malpractice.36 Judge Royal concludes:
The differential diagnosis method has an inherent
reliability; the differential etiology method does not. This
conclusion does not suggest that the differential etiology approach
has no merit. It simply means that courts, when dealing with
matters of reliability, should consider opinions based on the
differential etiology method with more caution. It also means that
courts should not conflate the two definitions.37
C. Developing a More Coherent and Explicit Procedure a Court Should Follow
When It Attempts to Answer the Specific-Causation Question
Clarity on the difference between routine diagnostic practices and
differential etiology as the term is used by the law clears away the potential for
confusion and bias that arises from conflating the two concepts. However, it does
not tell us how to go about assessing an expert’s search for background causes of an
effect.

32.
See Thomas v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 443 Fed. App’x. 58, 62 (6th Cir. 2011).
33.
537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1359–60 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
34.
See, e.g., Rhodes v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D.D.C. 2013)
(physician failed to consider breast cancer as part of her differential diagnosis of patient).
35.
For a useful discussion of expertise acquired in this way, see David L. Faigman
et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past,
Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994). For a discussion of the importance of the frequency and timing
of feedback in assessing expert judgment and intuition, see Daniel Kahneman, Chapter
Twenty-Two, in THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
36.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 2.
37.
Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. See generally David L. Faigman & Jennifer
Mnookin, The Curious Case of Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
607, 614 (2018).
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Courts have offered very little systematic guidance on this point. Many
courts have reiterated the position first set out in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation.38 For example, Best v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc. relies on that case in
offering up the following specific-causation guidance to lower courts in the Sixth
Circuit:
We hereby adopt the following differential-diagnosis
test, adapted from the Third Circuit’s well-reasoned opinion: A
medical-causation opinion in the form of a doctor’s differential
diagnosis is reliable and admissible where the doctor (1)
objectively ascertains, to the extent possible, the nature of the
patient’s injury (“A physician who evaluates a patient in
preparation for litigation should seek more than a patient’s selfreport of symptoms or illness and . . . should . . . determine that a
patient is ill and what illness the patient has contracted.”), (2)
“rules in” one or more causes of the injury using a valid
methodology, and (3) engages in “standard diagnostic techniques
by which doctors normally rule out alternative causes” to reach a
conclusion as to which cause is most likely.39
The Best court calls this a “test,” but, in fact, it is only an outline that
describes the steps required if one is to conduct a differential etiology. Step One
requires the expert to properly ascertain the injury, i.e., perform a differential
diagnosis in the medical sense. Step Two requires the expert (or often another
expert) to determine whether the exposure in question is capable of causing the
claimed condition. Only if a relevant dose of the substance could cause the condition
should the claimant be able to prove that it did so in a particular case. Thus, the
second step is to “rule in” the putative cause. Step Three is the critical step of “ruling
out” alternative causes.
The following three Parts of this Article follow this roadmap: getting the
diagnosis right, ruling in suspect causes (general causation), and ruling out
competing causes (specific causation). Although the central purpose of this Article
is to propose detailed guidelines to assess specific causation through the method of
differential etiology, this journey necessarily goes through general causation. First
and foremost, if there is no proof of general causation, the analysis must end there;
claims of specific causation, ipso facto, cannot proceed without proof of general
causation. Second, the evaluation of specific causation depends necessarily on the
quantum of proof of general causation, not only as to the putative cause of the
plaintiff’s condition but also as to alternative causes for that condition. Proof of
specific causation is invariably bound up with the available evidence for general
causation for all potential causes.

II. GETTING THE DIAGNOSIS RIGHT
The first step of differential etiology is coming to a proper diagnosis.
Occasionally, what may appear to be a disagreement about the cause of the
individual’s injury is a disagreement about the diagnosis. This has occurred in the
38.
39.

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
563 F.3d 171, 180 (6th Cir. 2009).
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asbestos litigation because if an individual has an ailment strongly linked to asbestos
exposure—asbestosis or mesothelioma—then the cause of the ailment is not in
doubt. A diagnosis of mesothelioma is rarely controversial. However, the parties
sometimes disagree as to whether the individual is suffering from asbestosis or from
some other lung impairment. 40 Diagnostic disputes arise with respect to other
exposures as well.41 Courts rarely, if ever, exclude an expert’s diagnosis testimony.
However, they may well exclude his etiology testimony at least in part because of
the shaky diagnosis.42
Although relatively few cases presently turn on the diagnosis, the
increasing use of genetic information may cause this situation to change. Bowen v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. is one case where this was true.43 In Bowen, the
plaintiff and several other children were exposed to the fungicide Benlate in utero,
allegedly causing birth defects. The defendant claimed, however, that the plaintiff
suffered from CHARGE syndrome, a genetic ailment involving multiple birth
defects. Plaintiff’s experts disagreed because they believed the plaintiff did not meet
enough of the criteria for this diagnosis. Therefore, they ruled out genetics as a
cause. However, the court acquiesced to a defense request for genetic testing. The
results indicated that the plaintiff’s genetic profile contained a gene, CHD7, that had
mutated. To that point in time, while not all individuals diagnosed with CHARGE
syndrome exhibited this mutation, every individual with this mutation had been
diagnosed as having the ailment. Ultimately, the trial court excluded the testimony
of one of the plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Howard, who, in spite of this new information,
continued to argue that Benlate caused the plaintiff’s birth defects and that in some
unexplained way the fungicide and the mutation acted together to cause her injury.44
Bowen represents an extreme case because, according to the court,
everyone with the mutated gene ultimately suffers from the syndrome. It is rare for
any single genetic defect to inevitably cause a specific injury. Nevertheless, genetic
information has become more important in narrowing the possible causes of an
individual’s ailment. We discuss the potentially increasing importance of genetic
information below.

III. RULING IN: GENERAL CAUSATION
Although the central goal of this Article is to help decision makers with the
problem of specific causation, such arguments are contingent on a general-causation
framework. As the following discussion of validity threats, types of evidence, and
40.
See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 766–68 (Tex. 2007).
41.
Tamraz v. Lincoln Electric Co., 620 F.3d. 665 (6th Cir. 2010) involved a
dispute as to whether the plaintiff was suffering from Parkinson’s Disease or manganism. As
in the asbestos situation, the diagnosis is critical to the issue of causation as the latter disease
is caused by exposure to manganese, a substance with which the plaintiff came in contact as
a welder.
42.
This was the outcome in Tamraz, id. at 670.
43.
Civ. A. 97C-06-194 CH, 2005 WL 1952859 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 787 (Del. 2006).
44.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on different grounds. Bowen v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., Inc., 906 A.2d 787 (Del. 2006).
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the Bradford Hill indicia suggests, the evidence for general causation with respect
to an exposure in question—exposure meaning a toxicological, microbiological,
environmental, pharmaceutical, or other suspected disease-promoting agent—may
be relatively weak or quite strong. Other things being equal, when the evidence for
general causation is strong, and especially when the strength of the exposure–disease
relationship as demonstrated in a body of research is substantial, the plaintiff faces
a lower threshold in establishing the substance as the cause in a particular case than
when the relationship is weaker. Only with a good understanding of the evidence
available to prove general causation can one develop a systematic approach to the
determination of specific causation. Moreover, in some situations the scientific
evidence used to establish general causation is in fact the primary evidence available
to establish specific causation.45 We thus begin with a discussion of the second step
of the analysis: establishing general causation, on which subsequent consideration
of specific causation will often rest.
Evidence of causation, whether general or specific, is often a matter of
judgment. Because they are frequently referred to in toxic-tort opinions, we use the
well-known Bradford Hill indicia as one approach for assessing general causation.46
Bradford Hill wrote for a sophisticated, scientific audience and was primarily
concerned with determining general causation—what he would have simply referred
to as causation. Our objective in this Part is to place the indicia in context. We
endeavor to make certain assumptions explicit that Bradford Hill took for granted.
Specifically, we consider the bread-and-butter scientific issues of validity (both
internal and external). Moreover, although Bradford Hill was only addressing causal
inference in the field of epidemiology, we use the indicia to discuss inferences in
toxicology, clinical trials, and the emerging field of genetics. This Part explores the
myriad factors that scientists would consider when coming to a judgment regarding
general causation. Therefore, we defer an explication of the Bradford Hill indicia
until after a discussion of validity and the types of evidence used in assessing general
causation.
We also note here that in the 56 years since Bradford Hill’s seminal
publication, his indicia of causation have been repeatedly reappraised in the contexts
of their applicability to specific problems and have been subject to a number of

45.
See infra Section IV.
46.
Some courts have approached Bradford Hill’s article as setting forth criteria
for general causation. This is an over-reading of his intentions. We agree with Susan Haack’s
comments concerning the limits of what Bradford Hill provided. She, and we, prefer the term
indicia (or guidelines or perhaps touchstones) to criteria. She notes they are not criteria in the
sense that they provide a decision procedure or a checklist to be mechanically followed. Susan
Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J. HEALTH
& BIOMEDICAL L. 253, 276 (2008). Ultimately, a conclusion about causation in close cases is
a matter that is difficult if not impossible to reduce to an algorithm. We will be satisfied if we
provide a roadmap that allows courts to more clearly articulate the types of information upon
which such judgments should be based.
The Bradford Hill indicia are far from the final word in assessing causation.
In the last few decades, statisticians, epidemiologists, and others have developed a number of
other sophisticated methods of assessing general causation. See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL & DANA
MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (2018).
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scientific and philosophical critiques. 47 During the intervening period the
mathematical, statistical, philosophical, and computer-science communities have
engaged with problems of general and specific causal inference, including the
development of more formal, mathematical languages for modeling causality than
existed during Bradford Hill’s lifetime.48 As the field of causal analysis has matured,
these developments are increasingly appearing in monographs, textbooks, and more
recently, popularizations for wider audiences, some of which suggest legalcausation relevance.49 While this work has not and indeed may never converge into
a single, generally accepted “science of causation,” some of its concepts will likely
be introduced into tort proceedings and ultimately influence tort law in ways we
cannot now foresee. Rather than anticipate the specifics of that future, we will
assume change will be evolutionary and here argue that the Bradford Hill indicia,
whose utility for appraising general causation is generally accepted in tort law, can
contribute to the resolution of specific-causation questions under current tort law in
ways unlikely to be dramatically overthrown. We might add that while undoubtedly
this literature will eventually influence how courts think about general causation, its
application to the specific-causation problem is still in very early stages.
We begin our discussion of general causation with a topic largely implicit
in the Bradford Hill Guidelines: threats to validity. We then review the types of data
that may be brought to bear on the general causal question, including toxicological,
epidemiological, and genetic data.
A. Validity
A fundamental objective of science is to make causal assertions based on
reproducible empirical relationships. However, empirical observations may mislead

47.
See Nancy Potischman & Douglas L. Weed, Causal Criteria in Nutritional
Epidemiology, 69(6) AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1309S (1999); Michael Höfler, The
Bradford Hill Considerations on Causality: A Counterfactual Perspective, 2 EMERGING
THEMES EPIDEMIOLOGY 11 (2005); Thomas A. Glass et al., Causal Inference in Public Health,
34 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 61 (2005); Kristen M. Fedak et al., Applying the Bradford Hill
Criteria in the 21st Century: How Data Integration Has Changed Causal Inference in
Molecular Epidemiology, in 12 EMERGING THEMES IN EPIDEMIOLOGY 14 (2015); John P. A.
Ioannidis, Exposure-Wide Epidemiology: Revisiting Bradford Hill, 35(11) STATS. IN
MED. 1749 (2016).
48.
See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION
AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007); JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS,
REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2d ed. 2009); CAUSALITY: STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
APPLICATIONS (Carlo Berzuini, Philip Dawid & Luisa Bernardinell eds., 2012); TYLER
VANDERWEELE, EXPLANATION IN CAUSAL INFERENCE: METHODS FOR MEDIATION AND
INTERACTION (2015); JOSEPH Y. HALPERN, ACTUAL CAUSALITY (2019); PAUL
ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CAUSAL
INFERENCE (2019); MARIUSZ MAZIARZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS:
CAUSAL INFERENCES AND POLICY PROPOSALS (2020); ALEXANDER BOCHMAN, A LOGICAL
THEORY OF CAUSALITY (2021).
49.
See, e.g., PEARL & MACKENZIE, supra note 46.
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us, and the causal conclusions we draw from the observations may be invalid due to
a study’s data collection plan and/or data-analytic approach.
Formally, scientific research typically examines relationships between
putative causes and effects of interest in collections (i.e., “samples” of persons,
animals, tissue, or cells with defined characteristics) under stipulated study
conditions—these being the circumstances of the research in the laboratory, clinic,
field, or other specialized research environment—and uses these observed
relationships to draw inferences about broader “populations” or processes. Such
inferences, whether causal or only correlational, are considered to be “internal” if
they are generalizations of relationships seen in particular studies to larger
populations with the same or very similar defined characteristics, under the same or
very similar conditions of those studies, or alternatively, “external” if they are
extrapolations to notably different populations and/or conditions. Validity of a
research study refers to the extent to which a study’s methods preclude or diminish
potential validity threats—i.e., flaws in data collection and/or analysis that distort
such inferences.50 The validity of a study’s conclusions is measured by the extent to
which the study has successfully excluded plausible alternatives to its claimed
exposure–disease relationships.
In the context of this Article, validity inquiries involve distinguishing (a)
exposure––condition associations for which no such validity threats are sufficiently
plausible to viably compete with the causal hypothesis, from (b) exposure–condition
relationships that do admit viable alternative explanations because one or more
validity threats cannot be confidently excluded.
Validity is a continuous assessment but may be described on a graded scale,
e.g., low, high, very high, or invalid and valid when abbreviated at the extremes.
“Internal validity” and “external validity” refer, respectively, to the validity of
internal and external inferences. We discuss these in turn, giving greatest attention
to the former because external validity is necessarily contingent on internal validity.
1. Internal Validity
Internal validity of a causal inference is demonstrated by exclusion of
specific threats to that inference, i.e., noncausal or unreliable explanations for
empirical associations based on a study’s methods rather than reproducible
relationships in nature. With few exceptions (e.g., biological placebo effects),
validity threats fall within five broad categories: time reversals, selection bias,
information bias, confounding, and chance.51 We briefly introduce each.

50.
DAVID G. KLEINBAUM ET AL., EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND
QUANTITATIVE METHODS 181–280 (1982) (discussing validity of epidemiologic research);
WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE (2002).
51.
Daniel I. Sessler & Peter B. Imrey, Clinical Research Methodology 1: Study
Designs and Methodologic Sources of Error, 121 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1034, 1035–41
(2015); Daniel I. Sessler & Peter B. Imrey, Clinical Research Methodology 2: Observational
Clinical Research, 121 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1043, 1046–47 (2015); Aalok K. Kacha et
al., Clinical Study Designs and Sources of Error in Medical Research, 32 J. CARDIOTHORACIC
& VASCULAR ANESTHESIA 2789, 2790–94 (2018); KLEINBAUM ET AL., supra note 50.
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All definitions of cause-and-effect relationships require cause to precede
effect in time. Time reversal occurs when research studies misconstrue the time
sequence of exposure and condition. This seems unlikely in principle but in fact can
easily happen when, as is usually the case, the specific timing of exposure onset and
condition initiation are unknown. Consider, for instance, a hypothesized microbial
cancer initiator. Researchers comparing tissue samples from cancer patients with
tissue from comparable sites in healthy controls might base a causal inference on
more frequent recovery of the microbe from tissue of cancer patients than from other
patients with noncancerous conditions. However, an alternative explanation is that
changes in the tissue environment due to preclinical cancer, such as a change in pH,
may have made formerly healthy tissue more subject to colonization by the subject
microbe. The cancer might thus be a contributory cause to the organism’s ability to
colonize the tissue; instead of the organism causing the cancer, the cancer may have
caused colonization by the microbe. More generally, such time reversals are
frequently at least conceivable when an exposure occurs gradually over time, and as
for cancer generally, the time of onset of a pathological process manifesting later as
disease is unknown. Such a biologically plausible explanation would greatly
diminish the internal validity of the causal inference.52
Selection bias refers to a tendency of a study’s methods to either understate
or overstate the exposure–disease association in the target population due to an
asymmetric subject-selection process that gives different chances of study inclusion
to different individuals and members of different subgroups. Two well-known
examples are Berkson’s bias and regression to the mean. In an early example of the
former,53 the relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer was apparently
attenuated in a case-control comparison by conducting the study within hospitals,
where patient smoking exposures were generally elevated due to then-unknown
relationships of smoking to cardiovascular and other diseases. Patients required
extended hospitalizations at a time when acute myocardial infarctions from
cardiovascular diseases were initially treated with weeks of hospitalization, so that
smoking exposure in hospitalized patients tended to overrepresent smoking in the
general population. Regression to the mean occurs when individuals are selected for
some intervention or subsequent assessment based on their extreme values of what
is to be assessed. Because data often fluctuate randomly due to inherent variability
of target quantities or random-measurement error, we should expect measures of
group centrality to become less extreme when measured subsequently due simply to
the play of chance. For example, if we select students who did poorly on the LSAT
52.
For a case that turned in part on this issue, see Guinn v. AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals LP, 602 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff averred that the
drug Seroquel, prescribed to treat her bipolar depression, caused weight gain, which in turn
caused her to develop diabetes. Although the plaintiff was not diagnosed with diabetes until
four years after beginning to take Seroquel, the court noted that the development of diabetes
occurs gradually over many years, and approximately half the patients diagnosed with
diabetes have actually had the disease for about five years prior to diagnosis. Thus, "the
temporal relationship in this case does not provide strong evidence of causation; in fact, it
appears to equally indicate that Guinn may have already developed diabetes before ever
taking Seroquel."
53.
Richard Doll & Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung:
Preliminary Report, 2 BRITISH MED. J. 739, 743–44 (1950).
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for an LSAT-prep class, their subsequent improved aggregate performance could be
due to the benefits of the class or simply regression to the mean of the individuals’
abilities. Similarly, regression to the mean explains why last year’s best mutual
funds virtually always perform relatively less well, and last year’s worst mutual
funds virtually always perform relatively better, during the next year.
Information bias, analogously, refers to a tendency to understate or
overstate exposure–disease association due to asymmetries in a data collection
process after sample selection. Recall bias is a well-known special case. For
example, women who have a child with a birth defect are more likely to recall all
drug use during their pregnancy than are mothers with a healthy child. Mothers with
children without a birth defect may simply have forgotten they took certain
medication because their attention has not previously been directed to it, while
mothers of affected children are more likely to have gone over in their minds
everything that occurred during their pregnancy that might explain their children’s
injuries. Similarly, patients’ quality-of-life assessments may be lower if assessed
during physician visits occasioned by exacerbations of their chronic diseases, rather
than at random times.
Confounding is the misattribution error committed by a Florida resident
who, on being informed that Floridians suffer twice the per capita mortality of
Alaskans, moves to Alaska to prolong his lifespan. He has neglected to consider that
this effect may be due to Floridians being in aggregate older, for which no move
northward can compensate. The potential for confounding is present whenever a
third variable associated with both exposure and disease in a study sample is
unrecognized in the ensuing analysis, allowing effects of the third variable, the
confounder, to masquerade as effects of the exposure. In the preceding example, the
exposure is state of residence, the outcome is death, and the confounder is age.
Confounding can be controlled in numerous ways, most effectively in principle by
basing inferences only on comparisons between subjects who are homogeneous with
respect to the confounder(s) or by randomized experimentation. But in observational
studies, where randomization is impossible, confounding is an ever-present threat
because confounding may lurk in the underlying population and propagate to the
sample, or arise, sometimes unobserved or unrecognized, from selection bias,
information bias, or nonrandom loss of follow-up data.
Invalid internal inferences can also arise solely due to chance simply
because relationships in samples inevitably differ somewhat from those in the
underlying populations. Measurements of quantities inevitably vary somewhat
around the true values, and categorizations including diagnoses are subject to
random misassignments (as distinct from systematic calibration errors). 54 Large
departures tend to occur less frequently than small ones, but when they do occur in
samples, they can seriously mischaracterize the populations or processes from which
54.
Thus, literally projecting relationships observed in samples back to their
encompassing populations subjects inferences to random instability. The degree of instability
is commensurate with the degree of underlying variability resulting from the combination of
population heterogeneity with measurement variability. But it is roughly inversely
proportional, on the scale of the measurements studied, to the square root of the number of
study participants.
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those samples arise. In principle, the chance misfortune of having obtained
unrepresentative data is a potential alternative explanation to a systematic causal
association for any associations seen in research data. Methods are thus needed for
deciding when this ever-present potential alternative explanation is sufficiently
implausible to ignore, thus allowing valid internal inference from sample to
population.
A variety of methods, based on several statistical schools of thought, have
been proposed for doing this. Although this may be changing, the dominant methods
in the scientific literature for making such assessments have been p-values,
confidence intervals, and the statistical-hypothesis tests they embody.
A “p-value” is a statistic—that is, a value calculated from a collection of
data—that localizes some specific quantitative summary of the data, most simply a
mean, proportion, or correlation within a distribution of possible values it might
have taken were the research to be repeated many times. Consider the following
example.55
Suppose researchers wish to study whether drug X improves the health
outcomes of men and women equally. The researcher draws a sample of 50 men and
50 women at random from 5,000 males and 5,000 females exposed to a particular
medication. These individuals are examined to ascertain whether the medication had
improved their health outcome, and the results indicate the drug helped 38% of the
men and 58% of the women. The p-value answers the following question: If the drug
is equally effective for all 5,000 males and 5,000 females, for what fraction of
possible random samples of 50 men and 50 women would researchers have found a
discrepancy (suitably measured) as large as or larger than that observed in the
current sample?
The assumption that the drug’s effectiveness in the population is the same
for men and women is called the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis asserts that
there is no difference between the fractions of men and women in the whole
population whose health outcomes the drug will improve and therefore that
differences in the fractions between the samples of men and women are thus due to
random variation—the luck of the draw.
The p-value is the probability of getting data with a male-female
discrepancy as extreme as or more extreme than in the actual data, given that the
null hypothesis is true:
p = Probability (as or more extreme data | null hypothesis in model)56
55.
The example is adapted from Chapter 5 in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 5.34.
56.
Since p is calculated by assuming the null hypothesis is correct (no real
difference in improvement rates), the p-value cannot give the chance that this hypothesis is
true. The p-value merely gives the chance of getting evidence against the null hypothesis as
strong as or stronger than the evidence at hand—assuming the null hypothesis to be correct.
No matter how many samples are obtained, the null hypothesis is either always right or always
wrong. Chance affects the data, not the hypothesis. With the frequentist interpretation of
chance, there is no meaningful way to assign a numerical probability to the null hypothesis.
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A small p-value supplies some evidence of disparate impact, but a large pvalue would merely reflect insufficient evidence in the data to confidently refute the
null hypothesis. Regrettably, multiple negatives are involved here. A statistical test
is essentially an argument by contradiction. The “null hypothesis” asserts no
difference in the population—that is, no disparate impact. Small p-values speak
against the null hypothesis—there is disparate impact because the observed
difference is hard to explain by chance alone.57 Conversely, large p-values indicate
that the data are compatible with the null hypothesis: the observed difference is easy
to explain by chance (though this may be because the data are not very informative,
rather than because the null hypothesis is true). In this example, p = 4.5%. If the null
hypothesis is true and, as here, 48 total events occur among 5,000 members of each
sex, there is only a 4.5% chance of getting a difference in health outcomes of 20
percentage points or more. The p-value for the observed discrepancy is 4.5%, or
0.045.
The p-value is often thought of as a measure of the plausibility of the null
hypothesis in light of the data collected by a study. In practice, statistical analysts
often use certain preset “significance levels”—typically 5% or 1%—to aid in
interpretation. 58 Thus “significant” is merely a label for certain p-values.
Historically, when analysts have used the term significant, they mean only that the

See David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 21–23 (1983).
57.
Thus, if the p-value is low, this forces the researcher to choose between two
competing explanations: either a) the null hypothesis is false; or b) the null hypothesis is true,
but nevertheless an event of small probability has occurred. It seems reasonable to regard b)
as implausible, and thus a) as the preferable explanation, leading to rejection of the null
hypothesis. The smaller the p-value, the more confidence one can have in this conclusion.
58.
Much smaller values are used in “omics” studies, to account for simultaneous
performance of thousands, tens of thousands, or millions of tests. Note that appropriately
compensating in some manner for multiple simultaneous tests is of great importance
whenever such tests, even just a few, are used to address the same basic scientific question.
If each test is conducted at a = 5%, chance immediately becomes a much more plausible
alternative explanation for false positive results, vitiating the claim that the testing procedure
controls invalid results due to chance variation. This issue commonly arises in longitudinal
research, when individuals are studied by repeated measurement of the same characteristics
over time and when multiple outcomes are of interest—as is virtually always the case—in
studies of health care. In such situations, one needs to choose an a much smaller than 0.05.
For example, researchers sifting through a large number of correlations in search of
significant relationships will inevitably find some. A 0.05 significance test means that one
time in 20 we should expect to observe a relationship this strong even when the null
hypothesis is true. An example of this phenomenon may be found in Patricia Shiono and Mark
Klebanoff’s study concerning the teratogenicity of the drug Bendectin. Patricia Shiono &
Mark Klebanoff, Bendectin and Human Congenital Malformations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151,
151–55 (1989). The authors separately examined the relationship between the drug and 58
categories of malformation. Bendectin was significantly correlated with 3 types of defects:
microcephaly, congenital cataract, and lung malformations. The authors note that the three
significant correlations are exactly the number one would expect by chance using a .05
significance test for approximately 60 relationships. In such situations, one needs to choose
an α much smaller than 0.05.
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p-value is below some such conventional threshold value.59 In principle, publication
of a p-value allows every reader to apply his or her own personal statistical
significance threshold to each particular situation. In the above example, the
observed discrepancy of 4.5% is significant at a 5%, but not a 1%, threshold.
The Greek letter 𝛼 (alpha) is often used to symbolize such a consensus
“level,” or conventional threshold that, when used consistently, represents the
fraction of false positive tests of true null hypotheses deemed acceptable. Since 𝛼
may be set at any value, this approach is potentially very effective at limiting false
positive results due to chance. Rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true is known
as a Type I error. However, the inevitable cost of setting a stringent threshold (i.e.,
low 𝛼 for rejecting the null hypothesis) is an increase in the risk of making the
opposite mistake—false negative error: failing to reject the null hypothesis when in
fact there is a relationship. This is called a Type II error. The Greek letter β (beta) is
often used to symbolize this risk. It depends on the specific alternative hypothesis
entertained when the null is rejected. Figure 1 indicates these two ways in which we
may draw an incorrect conclusion based on sample data. Here, H0 denotes the null
hypothesis and H1 the alternative hypothesis, and thus the Type II error rate β
depends on the choice of the alternative hypothesis H1.
Population Reality
H0 true
D1: Reject H0 False Positive (Type I)
Error
Decision
Based
on
Sample D0: Accept H0
Data

H1 true
True Positive
No Error

[α = Probability of Wrongly [1−β = Probability of
Rejecting H0 When H0 is
Correctly Affirming H1
True]
When True]
True Negative
No Error

False Negative (Type II)
Error

[1−α = Probability of
Correctly Retaining H0
When True]

[β = Probability of Wrongly
Retaining H0 When H1 is
True]

Figure 1: Possible Decisions and Errors
The quantity 1−𝛽, which varies between studies even when 𝛼 is held fixed,
is called the “statistical power” of the hypothesis test. When power is sufficiently
high, typically 80% or 90%, it is reasonable and conventional for medical clinical
trials to regard a nonsignificant test as affirming the null hypothesis or something
close to it. Otherwise, a nonsignificant test reflects data simply insufficient in sample
size and/or measurement precision, relative to population and measurement
variability, to differentiate a true relationship from a truly null situation while
59.
Because the p-value is affected by sample size, it does not measure the extent
or importance of a difference. Suppose in our example we had a sample of 50,000 or even
500,000 of each sex. A small change in health outcomes of two or three percent may be
statistically significant but may be of little practical significance.
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maintaining the stipulated false positive rate, 𝛼.60 In these circumstances the null
hypothesis is “retained,” not accepted, but remains a plausible alternative
explanation for any observed relationship, thus invalidating an inferential claim
based on this relationship.
Statistical significance testing, as described above, may be applied not just
to null hypotheses but also to hypotheses positing non-null statistical relationships
of any specific strength represented by an association measure such as a correlation
or regression coefficient, or a ratio of rates (equivalently, “hazards”), risks, or odds.
The set of all values measuring the strength of a relationship that are retained by a
statistical significance test at level 𝛼 constitutes a “100(1−𝛼)% confidence interval.”
Such a confidence interval can be interpreted as the range of plausible strengths of
association (in the underlying population or otherwise characterizing the datageneration process) that are compatible with the data collected by a study.
The paradigm described above, although frequently used in scientific
studies, is not the only way to assess the possible role of random chance in research.
Many prominent statisticians and other scientists have questioned it, and the need
for change is increasingly accepted. 61 Alternatives to such classical-statisticalfrequentist significance testing based on quite different rationales, such as
Bayesian62 and empirical Bayesian inference, are ascendant and are likely to become
60.
Power is a function of a study’s sample size, the variability of contributing
measurements, the size of the effect one would like to be able to detect—i.e., the alternative
hypothesis—and the significance level used to guard against Type I error. Because power is
a function of the significance level, all other things being equal, minimizing the probability
of one type of error can be done only by increasing the probability of the other. For a useful
technical discussion of study designs given the relative importance of avoiding Type I or Type
II errors, see Michelle Burtis et al., Error Costs, Legal Standards of Proof, and Statistical
Significance, 25 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2017).
Because the power of any test is reduced as the size of an effect decreases,
Type II threats to causal conclusions are particularly relevant with respect to rare events.
Surprisingly, relatively few legal cases contain power discussions. See Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 722–23 (Tex. 1997); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d
1062, 1074 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d, 356 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2004); Doe 93 v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 98 Fed. Cl. 553, 568 (2011); Jon T. Powell, How to Tell the Truth with
Statistics: A New Statistical Approach to Analyzing the Bendectin Epidemiological Data in
the Aftermath of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1241, 1266–67
(1994) (setting forth formulae for calculating the power of case-control and cohort studies
from 2 x 2 contingency table data).
61.
Ronald L. Wasserstein and Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values:
Context, Process, and Purpose, 72(2) AMER. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016).
62.
The Bayesian approach, unlike the frequentist one, regards unknown
quantities (“parameters”) about which inference is required—in the above example, the true
success rates in the 5,000 men and 5,000 women—as themselves having probability
distributions—interpreted, however, as representing epistemic uncertainty rather than
physical randomness. One starts with a “prior distribution” for these quantities, representing
uncertainty ahead of seeing the data. This uncertainty is typically high and so represented by
a diffuse prior distribution, but genuine prior knowledge, perhaps from other studies, can be
incorporated. There is a formal method based on Bayes’s theorem (a mathematical result in
probability theory) for computing the “posterior distribution,” which updates the prior using
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more prominent in the scientific literature over time.63 But the preceding methods
are deeply rooted in current scientific practice. When used properly, they can help
discriminate between research observations for which chance is a more or less
plausible explanation, and thus between research findings for which chance is a
stronger or weaker threat to research validity. They are thus likely to continue to be
relevant to legal work for some time.
2. External Validity
Internal validity of a finding refers to the strength of its support, uniquely
among other explanations, among groups of subjects and under conditions like those
of the studies from which the finding was derived. External validity, in contrast,
refers to the rationale for extrapolating the finding to substantially different subjects
and/or conditions.64 If the finding, as is typical, consists of a measure of strength of
a relationship, then the finding is externally valid if that relationship persists and
remains similarly strong, despite changes in the nature of the subjects studied, the
conditions under which they are tested, and the ways in which the related variables
are measured.
Thus, if a study uncovers an apparent cause-and-effect relationship, the
researcher must determine to which categories of individuals the relationship can be
generalized. For example, if a study includes only adult men as subjects, the
researcher must determine whether the results can be generalized to women. When
there are alterations in the relationship with changes in the characteristics of
subjects, particular conditions, or measurement processes, then the variable with
which the relationship changes is called an effect modifier and is said to statistically
“interact” with the exposure in predicting the outcome. For example, if women who
take Drug A tend to live longer than otherwise, but men taking Drug A tend to die
earlier, then gender is said to modify the relationship of Drug A to mortality, and
Drug A and gender are said to interact in predicting death. Potential interactions
the information in the data, so representing the final state of knowledge of the unknown
parameters. A Bayesian analogue of a p-value, in the example, could be the posterior
probability that the true success rate for women exceeds that for men. In some cases, and for
specific prior distributions, such a Bayesian measure can be numerically the same as, or close
to, a frequentist p-value; but its interpretation would be entirely different. There is also a
Bayesian analogue of a confidence interval, the “credible interval,” which has a chosen
posterior probability of including the targeted unknown parameter. Again there can
sometimes be numerical similarities, but important interpretive distinctions, between
frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals. However, because the
fundamental output of a Bayesian analysis is a full posterior probability distribution for all
unknown parameters, this can be applied in much more flexible ways, not mimicking any
classical approach. ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2014). For a
law review article espousing this approach, see Neal C. Stout & Peter A. Valberg, Bayes’
Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 781 (2005).
63.
For useful discussions of alternative approaches, see ANTHONY WILLIAM
FAIRBANK EDWARDS, LIKELIHOOD (1992); GELMAN ET AL., supra note 62. For a case in which
an expert uses a Bayesian approach, see Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105–06 (D. Mass. 2013).
64.
For a discussion of external validity threats, see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note
11, § 4:39.
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between factors—such as the one between subjects and treatment in this example—
compromise external validity.65
Other examples involve the ability to generalize across race, ethnicity, and
class. Similar considerations apply to conditions under which an effect is said to
occur. Thrombolytic agents such as tissue plasminogen activator (tPA) are highly
beneficial when administered within a few hours after onset of ischemic stroke,
when the prospect of lysing the blot clot and thereby sparing brain tissue from
oxygen starvation and cell death outweighs the chance of initiating or exacerbating
intracranial bleeding, which itself can cause death of cells otherwise undamaged by
the initial stroke. However, hours later the chance of saving tissue has passed, while
the chance of bleeding has not, and so tPA use then is clearly disadvantageous.66
Time of administration since stroke onset thus modifies the relationship of
antithrombolytic therapy to death and disability after ischemic stroke.
External validity is of evident major concern in considering the
implications of animal studies and in vitro research for human health, because
interspecies extrapolations and extrapolations across vast dose ranges are frequently
involved. Interaction of research setting with treatment is another threat to external
validity. Even well-crafted experiments that do their best to assure internal validity
cannot necessarily ensure transferability from the laboratory to the world at large or
even, in some cases, to other laboratories. In the arena of toxic torts, this is often the
case because levels of exposure in a laboratory are not the same as exposures in the
world at large, an issue to which we return below.67 In behavioral studies of humans,
ethical considerations greatly limit the verisimilitude of decision-making, given the
artificiality of the laboratory setting. This is often a major consideration in scientific
evaluations of research in the forensic sciences.
B. Types of Evidence Available to Establish Causation
Courts almost universally agree that one must “rule in” the putative cause
of an injury before ruling out alternative causes.68 The goal is to persuade a court
that a substance is capable of causing the illness under consideration. Efforts to
answer this general causation question typically rely on several bodies of scientific
knowledge. These include toxicological, epidemiological, and other group-based
data on humans as well as genetic information.

65.
This example highlights an important point. One primary reason we need to
be concerned about external validity is that altering the group in question (women instead of
men) introduces a potential effect modifier that may alter the relationship between two other
variables (drug usage and life expectancy).
66.
Edward C. Jauch et al., Guidelines for the Early Management of Patients with
Acute Ischemic Stroke: A Guideline for Healthcare Professionals from the American Heart
Association/American Stroke Association, 44 STROKE 870 (2013).
67.
See infra Part III.B.1.
68.
For a review of the many cases adopting this position, see FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 21:6.
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1. Toxicology69
Toxicological science includes research at several different levels:
molecules, cells and other biological materials, nonhuman animals, and human
beings. Mechanistic toxicology studies the cellular, biochemical, and molecular
basis by which substances affect biological targets. Part of this endeavor involves
examining a substance’s chemical structure and comparing it to other compounds of
similar structure whose biological activity is better understood and for which there
is existing toxicity information. Thus, the process sometimes goes by the name
“structure-activity analysis.” Structure-activity relationships can expedite the
identification of potentially beneficial or harmful substances. However, modest
differences in chemical structure can lead to different levels of toxicity, in part
because of the way organisms metabolize the substance. Therefore, a structureactivity analysis is not determinative of toxic effects.70
In vitro testing provides an example of this principle. In vitro testing is
conducted on bacteria, human or animal cells, isolated tissues, embryos, or organs.
Such testing takes place outside a living organism. Cultures in a test tube or petri
dish are exposed to potential toxicants (or drugs). Toxicologists study the perfusion
of the substance through the culture and assess biological responses. These methods
are useful to mechanistic toxicologists because they can provide insight to the
mechanisms of toxicity, such as specifically how potentially cancer-causing
substances may damage DNA or cause other changes in a cell nucleus.
There are advantages to in vitro testing. It is much cheaper than tests on
living organisms. Additionally, living organisms are very complex, so it is often
difficult to identify interactions and processes of interest in humans. In vitro systems
are simpler than intact organisms, making it easier to isolate and study biological
interactions such as the ways immune system proteins attach themselves to antigens.
However, the most important shortcoming of in vitro tests from the law’s
perspective is their low external validity. The limited ability to extrapolate in vitro
test findings to effects of the substance on living organisms is a direct consequence
of in vitro systems’ simplicity because they cannot account fully for the environment
in which events occur within the organism. With respect to potential new
pharmacotherapies, for example, effectiveness in vitro more often than not fails to
translate into effectiveness in living animals. Impediments to extrapolation include
the following factors: a chemical may not be absorbed by living organisms; the
chemical may be distributed in a living organism such that more (or less) reaches
specific locations than would be predicted based on its absorption; and the chemical

69.
For an overview of this discipline by Joseph Rodricks, see id. § 22.17–.33.
70.
For example, benzene and the alkyl benzenes, e.g., toluene, xylene and
ethylbenzene, share a similar structure. This similarity is reflected in the fact that acute
exposure to each of them produces similar central nervous system anesthetic-like effects.
However, only benzene causes leukemia and damage to bone marrow. The damage is caused
not by benzene itself but a toxic metabolite of benzene. Cliona M. McHale et al., Current
Understanding of the Mechanism of Benzene-Induced Leukemia in Humans: Implications for
Risk Assessment, 32(2) CARCINOGENESIS 240 (2012).
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may be rapidly metabolized into a form or substance with a different activity profile
than the parent agent.71
In vivo testing, by contrast, is performed on living organisms other than
humans. Toxicologists investigate the life cycle of substances in the body: how they
are absorbed, distributed, metabolized, and eliminated from the organism. Such
research may be directly designed to study the impact of a substance on the test
species itself, but frequently its purpose is to tell us something about the substance’s
potential impact on humans.72
The primary strength of well-conducted animal studies is the ability to
exercise strong control of extraneous factors and thus assure internal validity. Test
animals may be inbred to be quite homogeneous and randomly assigned to treatment
or control so that, with a sufficient sample size, we can be reasonably certain that
any observed effect is due to the treatment. Moreover, the best studies are blinded
so that the researcher doing the experiment does not know whether a given animal
received a treatment or a placebo. A blinded study with randomized assignment to
treatment and sample size providing adequate power has very high internal validity
because, by design, it removes or substantially mitigates most forms of bias. In these
circumstances, we can be reasonably certain the exposure is the primary cause of
observed average differences in outcome, if such differences exceed what can be
expected from chance variation.73
However, extrapolation across species inevitably raises questions of
external validity. Thalidomide, a catastrophic teratogen in humans, provides an
instructive example. When it was initially used as a remedy for nausea in pregnant
women, it caused fetal limb malformations (phocomelia). Earlier in vivo testing
using rats had failed to indicate any malformations. Only subsequently did we come
to understand that while the drug produces similarly severe results in humans,
rabbits, and monkeys, this adverse consequence does not seem to occur in the rats

71.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.21.
72.
The choice of which animal models to employ is a complex one, influenced
by the end point of interest (e.g., cancer, birth defects, etc.), similarities between the animal
and human systems of interest, and, at a practical level, the costs involved in testing on
different species. The design of an animal study will vary depending on the type of injury—
acute, chronic, reproductive—one is investigating. See id. § 22.22.
73.
Unfortunately, a fair percentage of animal studies fail to conform to this ideal
and their results are appropriately suspect. For example, one study evaluated 290 animal study
abstracts containing two or more experimental groups that were accepted by the Society for
Academic Emergency Medicine. Vik Bebarta et al., Emergency Medicine Animal Research:
Does Use of Randomization and Blinding Affect the Results?, 10 ACAD. EMERG. MED. 684,
684–87 (2003). One hundred and ninety-four were not randomized, and 259 were not blinded.
The non-randomized and non-blinded studies had 3.4- and 3.2-fold higher odds, respectively,
of claiming a statistically significant outcome than did those that were randomized and
blinded. Id.; see also Nicolas A. Crossley et al., Empirical Evidence of Bias in the Design of
Experimental Stroke Studies: A Metaepidemiologic Approach, 39 STROKE 929, 929–34
(2008); John P.A. Ioannidis, Extrapolating from Animals to Humans, 4 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL
MED. 151 (2012). Before admitting expert testimony based on an animal study, it is highly
advisable to assess whether the study randomly assigned animals to treatments and used a
blinded design.
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in which it had been tested, nor in mice, hamsters, or other rodent species commonly
used in toxicological testing.74
Species differences are not the only threat to external validity posed by
animal studies. Dosage is also an issue. In some studies, the goal is to assess the
acute toxicity of a chemical, that is, the results from a single dose of the substance.
In other studies, the goal is to assess the toxicity of repeated or continuous exposure
over a longer or shorter time period. With respect to acute response studies, animal
researchers traditionally employed a quantal-response experiment to determine the
LD50, (i.e., the dosage, usually measured as milligrams per kilogram weight of the
animal, needed to kill half the animals in a study within a relatively short period of
time).75 Costs and evolving sensibilities regarding treatment of animals have caused
researchers to use this design less frequently. 76 In studies not focused on acute
poisoning, where the question is whether the drug causes cancer or similar adverse
outcomes, animals may be given the maximum tolerated dose (“MTD”), which is
defined conceptually as a dose just below what may cause premature mortality due
to short-term toxic effects.77
Why use such high doses? Many substances produce an adverse effect in
only a small percentage of organisms when ingested at a dose similar to that
encountered in the environment. Given this reality, at lower doses it would take a
prohibitively large number of animal subjects to detect a substance’s adverse effects
with any reliability. Smaller samples would generate an unacceptably large number
of Type II (i.e., false negative inferential errors, the failure to detect a toxic effect
when it exists).78 Consequently, given the expense of animal studies, researchers
assessing whether some substance is toxic may expose animals to relatively large
doses to ascertain if there is any effect (and to guard against the potential for false
negative results). If there is a positive result, toxicologists must then extrapolate a
predicted incidence at a more realistic lower dose rate.

74.
Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year
Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG & COSM. L.J. 458, 464 (1986).
75.
A substance with a median lethal dose of 1 mg/kg is generally considered
highly toxic. A substance with a median lethal dose of greater that 500 mg/kg is considered
slightly toxic.
76.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.23.
77.
See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on
Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 408 (2d ed. 2000).
78.
For example, if an adverse outcome occurs naturally—i.e., in the absence of
the exposure under investigation—in 2 of 100 cases, and exposure to the toxin at
approximately the dose humans would experience increases the incidence of the adverse
outcome to 3 in 100 (a fifty percent increase), a study using 200 animals (100 exposed and
100 controls) that resulted this outcome would not be statistically significant (at the 5% level).
Indeed, if these findings were replicated using a thousand animals (i.e., 15 of 500 sick in the
exposed group and 10 of 500 in the control group), the results would still not be statistically
significant. If, on the other hand, we increased the dose to ten times what humans were likely
to be exposed to, and at this greater dose 8 in 100 animals suffered the adverse effect under
investigation, a study producing this result with 200 animals would reach statistical
significance. And even this example is misleading because actual effects for animals and
humans may not be 3 in 100 but rather 3 in 1,000, or even less frequent.
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Extrapolation involves several issues. The first is simply the question of
how to equate a dose given an animal to a similar human dose. If one gives a
laboratory animal an X mg dose, what is the human equivalent? The question falls
within the field of allometry: the study of biological size and its consequences.
Unfortunately, there is apparently no uniformly accepted formula for such interspecies extrapolations. Traditionally, three methods of extrapolation have been
used: body-mass equivalence, surface-area equivalence, and caloric scaling across
species. 79 However, advances in pharmacokinetics (the study of the absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and excretion of drugs over time after introduction) and
pharmacodynamics (the study of the time course of the therapeutic and other drug
effects in relation to the dose and route of administration) 80 suggest other
considerations as well, such as differing bioavailabilities 81 of a substance across
species. Once one has resolved the dose-equivalence relationship, the basic issue of
extrapolation from high to low doses remains quite difficult, and estimating lowdose effects with high precision has not yet proved, and may never prove, to be
possible. There are a number of ways in which high-dose toxicity testing differs
from lower dose effects: there may be limits to the solubility of the compound;
enzymes may become saturated at high doses, limiting absorption; detoxification
mechanisms in the liver and elsewhere may be saturated; and metabolites may cause
toxicity that would not occur with lower doses. Each of these factors may produce
nonlinear effects, making extrapolation to dosages that reflect typical human
exposure problematic. This is especially the case if the animals were only exposed
to the MTD.82
Finally, we should note that animal studies may fail to capture human
experience because the nature of the exposure and/or injury differs from their human
counterparts. That was the problem with an animal study discussed in General
Electric v. Joiner.83 The plaintiff claimed that exposure to PCBs had advanced the
time of the onset of his lung cancer. The infant mice in the study in question were

79.
K. Schneider et al., Allometric Principles for Interspecies Extrapolation in
Toxicological Risk Assessment—Empirical Investigations, 39(3) REGUL. TOXICOLOGY &
PHARMACOLogy 334 (2004).
80.
Pharmacokinetics is a branch of pharmacology devoted to understanding what
happens to substances entering a living organism. These include any chemical xenobiotic
such as drugs, pesticides, and other chemicals.
81.
Bioavailability is a subcategory of absorption and is the fraction of an
administered dose of a substance that reaches the systemic circulation in the body. It is one
of the principal pharmacokinetic properties of substances. BASIC PHARMACOKINETICS AND
PHARMACODYNAMICS: AN INTEGRATED TEXTBOOK AND COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 44–45
(Sarah Rosenbaum ed., 2d ed. 2017).
82.
When regulatory agencies need to set a permissible dose based on animal study
research, they traditionally conduct tests designed to uncover a “no observed adverse effect
level” (NOAEL), which is defined as the highest dose at which there is no statistically
significant difference between subject animals and controls. Increasingly, agencies use a
slightly different approach called a Benchmark Dose (BMD). The agency objective is to
establish a reference dose (RfD) or reference concentration (RfC) of a toxin—i.e., a dose or
a concentration “that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious effects during
a lifetime.” See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.24.
83.
522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997).
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exposed in a different way and exhibited a different injury than that suffered by the
plaintiff. Therefore, the study–plaintiff relationship was untenable. This problem
occurs in other cases as well.84
Many of the issues discussed above also apply to human toxicology.
Specifically, the study of pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of substances in
humans plays an increasingly important role in assessing the biological plausibility
of a hypothesis that a substance may cause injury to individuals. An important part
of this inquiry involves estimates of the dose to which an individual is exposed. The
“first law” of toxicology is that the dose makes the poison. 85 With respect to
substances that are thought to have some threshold before they produce adverse
effects, ascertaining dose is key to determining if a particular injury is reasonably
attributable to a given substance. Toxicology can provide information as to the
threshold at which a substance becomes harmful. 86 Unfortunately, in many tort
situations, dosage is very hard to ascertain. And to complicate matters, dose per se
is not the only consideration. One must also understand the bioavailability of the
substance and attributes such as the age of the exposed individual.
2. Epidemiology87
Epidemiologists search for and assess potentially causal exposure–disease
relationships in observational data using two contrasting general research strategies:
cohort studies and case-control studies. Cohort studies compare the incidence of an
injury in groups of persons exposed to a substance to the incidence in groups of
persons not exposed or between groups otherwise varying in their levels of exposure.
Case-control studies, on the other hand, compare the degrees of preceding exposure
experienced by groups of persons who do (“cases”) or do not (“controls”) have an
illness or injury under investigation or among groups whose members differ in the
severity of illness or injury. Cohort or case-control studies are further designated as
“prospective” or “retrospective” depending on whether the data analyzed were
collected using methods specifically planned in advance (prospective) for this or a
closely related purpose, or whether they were collected previously for other
purposes and are being analyzed later (retrospective). The “prospective vs.
retrospective” classification is often a crude proxy for data quality for the purposes
of assessing a specific investigation. Epidemiological literature can be confusing in
this regard because the respective terms “prospective” and “retrospective” were
historically used as virtual synonyms for cohort and case control research. However,
84.
See McCarty v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc., No. 11-109-HRW_CJS, 2016 WL
2936435, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 11109-HRW, 2016 WL 1306067 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2016); In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 169 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
85.
The second law concerns the specificity of toxic effects of individual
chemicals. Due to the unique chemical structure of the agent and the laws of biology that
govern the response, chemicals cause some specific injuries. The third law is that humans are
animals and, therefore, the study of animals can provide useful insight into effects in humans.
See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 77, at 401.
86.
Some substances are thought to have no threshold below which they are not
harmful to some degree. Ionizing radiation is one example.
87.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 23.30–.47 (overview of this discipline
by Noel Weiss).
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that former usage has been replaced by their current characterization of the temporal
relationship between the investigation and the data collection process.
Depending on the disease context and study design, several related
statistics are most commonly used by epidemiologists to express the strength of a
relationship between exposure and the occurrence of an injury. In cohort studies,
when the time interval between the exposure and recognition of the injury is of little
relevance, either because these events are in close proximity such as in a
gastroenteritis outbreak after a contaminated meal, or the intervals between them are
otherwise quite uniform or observed only over a fixed follow-up interval such as a
year, the proportion experiencing the injury within a group is termed the “risk,” and
the ratio of the risks in groups differing in exposure is termed the “relative risk (RR)”
or synonymously the “risk ratio.” When the time interval varies substantially in a
way that matters, as is typically the case in studies of chronic diseases such as
cardiovascular disease and cancer, the “hazard ratio (HR)” is a superior measure of
the strength of the underlying etiological process. The hazard ratio is a ratio of the
rates at which disease events occur over time relative to the gradually diminishing
sizes of the remaining unaffected groups.
In case-control studies, the “odds ratio (OR)” is used. The odds ratio
represents the odds that an exposure has occurred given a particular outcome,
compared to the odds of the exposure having occurred in the absence of that
outcome. For events that rarely occur, or at least are quite uncommon during a time
period studied, the numerical values of these three association measures in the same
population will be quite similar, and the odds ratio from a sample is often used to
approximate a risk ratio and/or hazard ratio, leading to some slurring of the technical
terminology in the scientific literature.
Epidemiologists also use additional measures, known as “attributable
risks” and either “attributable fractions” or “etiologic fractions,” to assess the
aggregate impact of an exposure on disease occurrence in an exposed group and in
mixed populations of exposed and unexposed persons. Of particular relevance in the
legal context is the attributable fraction among the exposed = 1 − 1 / RR, which
exceeds one half when RR > 2, providing the “more likely than not” preponderance
of evidence basis for using RR > 2 as a justification for awards in many tort cases.88

88.
For example, imagine that in a certain area there were 5,000 newborns and the
mothers of 1,000 of these children took Bendectin during pregnancy. Among the 1,000
children whose mothers took Bendectin, 60 were born with and 940 born without a specific
birth defect. Presuming the defects become manifest in utero and are observable at birth, the
time dimension is constant and may be disregarded. Among the 4,000 children whose mothers
did not take Bendectin, we find that 160 were born with and 3,840 were born without that
defect. The cumulative incidence, also known as the risk, among the exposed children is 60 /
(60 + 940) = .06 and among nonexposed children is 160 / (160 + 3840) = .04. The relative
risk is thus .06 / .04 = 1.50. Among the 60 + 160 = 220 cases born with the defect, the odds
of the mother having taken Benedictin were 60 / 160 = 0.375, while the corresponding odds
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Epidemiological studies have several advantages over other toxicological
studies. They share with animal studies the advantage that they measure the effect
of a substance on a whole organism, not simply the effect on a cell culture or an
organ. And they sidestep the difficult cross-species comparisons confronting animal
studies when those studies are used to predict effects on humans. In sum, they
confront fewer external validity challenges to their results.
However, cohort and case-control studies have disadvantages as well.
Because they are observational studies rather than true experiments, there is always
the possibility that the true relationship between a “cause” and an “effect” has been
distorted by failure to account for some unmeasured confounder(s) linked to both.
This problem is one of internal validity—our confidence that the study design
warrants a conclusion that an observed correlation reflects a causal relationship
rather than one due to confounding or another source of methodological deficiency.
Noel Weiss provides the following example. In a study to investigate the
effect of fertility-drug use on ovarian-tumor incidence, the exposed group is women
who took certain fertility drugs. The comparison, however, cannot simply be women
who did not take the drugs, because some in such a group would have borne children,
which itself reduces the chances of developing ovarian cancer. A proper comparison
group, therefore, is comprised of other infertile women. Using such a control group
avoids a potential selection threat to the validity of the study. Failure to do so risks
erroneously inferring that fertility drugs increase ovarian cancer solely because
fertile women do not need infertility drugs.89 As we noted above, there are several
well-understood general threats to internal validity of observational studies,
including reverse causation, selection bias, measurement bias, and confounding.90
3. Clinical Trials
Clinical trials have relatively higher external validity than animal studies
because they do not require cross-species extrapolations. When properly done, they
among mothers of those born without the defect were 940 / 3840 = 0.245, yielding an odds
ratio of 1.53, very similar to the relative risk of 1.50 because the birth defect was quite
uncommon in both groups.
The attributable fraction among the exposed is 1 − 1/RR = 1 − 1/1.50 = 1/3.
Also, the “attributable risk” is the absolute difference between risks of exposed and
unexposed groups. In our example, the unexposed risk is .04 and the exposed risk is .06. Thus,
the risk attributable to Bendectin, if Bendectin use were the only difference between exposed
and unexposed children, is .02. The inverse of this attributable risk, 50, is called the “number
needed to harm (NNH),” i.e., the number of women taking Bendectin during pregnancy from
whose pregnancies one would expect, on average, one child with the particular birth defect.
In a mixed population in which 10% of mothers took Benedictin during pregnancy, the
“population attributable risk” of the birth defect from Benedictin would be 10% of the
attributable risk among the exposed, or 0.10 × 0.02 = 0.002 = 0.2%. Finally, the “population
attributable fraction” is the ratio of the population attributable risk to the total risk in the
population. Thus, if the birth defect were known to be present in 0.5% percent of newborns
in the population, then the population attributable fraction due to Benedictin would be
0.002/0.005 = 40%.
89.
Noel Weiss, General Concepts in Epidemiology, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra
note 11, §23.35.
90.
See supra pp. 14–15.
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also share with animal studies the internal-validity virtues of other true experiments.
Imagine, for example, that there is some genetic trait that strongly influences how
someone responds to a drug. In a sufficiently large, randomized trial, those who
possess this trait are highly likely to be very nearly equally represented in the control
(receive the placebo) and experimental (receive the drug) groups, and therefore this
trait should not affect the observed relationship between the presence or absence of
the drug and the course of the illness the drug is designed to treat. This is equally
true regardless of whether the genetic trait is known or unknown to the researchers.
Because of this and other attributes, well-designed clinical trials are
sometimes called the “gold standard” of research on toxic injuries. However, some
caveats are in order. First, just as was the case in animal studies, a well-designed
study should wherever possible employ a blinded or “masked” methodology to
avoid measurement bias. In clinical trials, this means that optimally both the patient
receiving a drug and the physicians or other health professionals administering the
drug and/or assessing its toxic effects are unaware of whether the individual is
receiving the drug or its placebo or other comparator. Unfortunately, not all studies
do or even can follow such procedures. When they do not, internal validity may be
compromised because we cannot be certain whether the observed result is due to the
substance in question or the expectations of the patient and/or the physician. A
second limitation arises from the fact that cost considerations restrict the size of even
large clinical trials. Consequently, they may not detect rare adverse outcomes.
Moreover, for a combination of practical and ethical reasons, clinical trials are only
rarely performed to assess well-established clinical practices, even when these are
not well founded in evidence. Neither can clinical trials normally include some
vulnerable groups such as young children. Finally, with few exceptions randomizedtrial participants must be restricted to those who can ethically be randomized to any
treatment group, and the extent of experimental control and the intensity of clinical
follow-up may further restrict participation, making many clinical-trial results most
directly relevant to relatively narrow groups of patients.
4. Susceptibility and Genetic Information91
Individuals vary greatly in their responses to various substances. For
example, the relative risk of getting lung cancer is quite high for smokers. 92
Nevertheless, the great majority of average smokers (perhaps 85% to 90%) do not

91.
Valuable discussions of the increasing role of genetic information in toxic tort
litigation may be found in the following: Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein,
Relative Risk Greater than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41
JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2001); Susan R. Poulter, Genetic Testing in Toxic Injury Litigation: The
Path to Scientific Certainty or Blind Alley?, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 211 (2001); Gary E. Marchant,
Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006); Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics
and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671 (2007); Steve C.
Gold, The More We Know, The Less Intelligent We Are?– How Genomic Information Should,
& Should Not, Change Toxic Tort Causation Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2010).
92.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 25.29.
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contract this disease.93 A full understanding of variations in susceptibility is still out
of our reach, but some factors are understood.
Increasingly, genetic research is uncovering effects produced by genetic
variations. 94 For example, conventional epidemiologic research failed to
demonstrate a link between breast cancer and smoking although tobacco smoke
contains known mammary carcinogens.95 As Gold et al. note:
Genomic investigations observed that variations in the NAT2
gene, which codes for a carcinogen-neutralizing enzyme, 96
dramatically influenced the breast cancer danger from smoking.
Women whose genes coded for the most protective form of the
enzyme had no increased risk of breast cancer even if they
smoked, but women smokers with less protective forms of the
gene were eight times more likely to get breast cancer than were
women with the same genotype who did not smoke. It remains
true, however, that not all women smokers with the less protective
genotype will develop breast cancer, some women smokers
develop breast cancer even though they do not have that genotype,
and some women develop breast cancer even though they neither
smoke nor have that genotype.97
In this example, the genetic makeup of the individual alters susceptibility
to a toxin. 98 In epidemiological terms, the NAT2 gene modifies the association
between smoking and breast cancer, and while smoking causes breast cancer in some
women, smoking is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause in all cases. In some
cases, such as sickle-cell disease, one’s genetic makeup may cause an injury directly

93.
This observation underlines the point that a large relative risk does not mean
that there is a substantial absolute risk associated with exposure. Too often, reports of
increased relative risk fail to clarify that the absolute increase in risk may be very small. See
Alexandra L.J. Freeman & David J. Spiegelhalter, Communicating Health Risks in Science
Publications: Time for Everyone to Take Responsibility, 16 BMC MED. 207 (2018).
94.
Toxicogenomics is the area of study most directly associated with this type of
investigation. It uses in vivo and in vitro research techniques to research the effects of
exposing variations of many genes to a suspected toxin. Changes may involve how an
exposure causes a genomic change as well as whether it effects a change in a gene’s
expression. Epigenetics is the study of genetic expression. “Epigenetics examines the
biochemical modifications placed ‘above’ or ‘on top of’ DNA, which do not alter the actual
sequence of the DNA but can cause a gene to be turned on or off or to be expressed more
strongly or weakly.” Susan E. Brice & Whitney V. Christian, The Use of Genetic Evidence to
Defend Against Toxic Tort Claims – Part III, 29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 4 (2017).
95.
OFF. ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004).
96.
An enzyme is a protein that catalyzes a chemical reaction.
97.
STEVE C. GOLD ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE OF FACTUAL CAUSATION: AN EDUCATIONAL MODULE 168 (2016). This example
understates the complexity of the issue of gene variation and susceptibility. Typically,
susceptibility variation is the result of multiple genes.
98.
See Krik v. Schaeffler Grp. USA, Inc., 887 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 2018).
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without the introduction of an external substance. 99 In such situations a genetic
explanation may compete with other causal hypotheses.
Biomarkers of exposure offer another important way in which genetic
information may affect a causal analysis.100 In this context, a biomarker is a genetic
or other cellular change that occurs when one has been exposed to a substance. We
discuss biomarkers more thoroughly in the specific-causation section.
C. Putting the Pieces Together: Bradford Hill Indicia101
This last Section of Part III uses the Bradford Hill indicia to assess whether
the available evidence supports a general causal conclusion.102 The discussion is
intended to tie together the first two Sections of this Part by indicating how the types
of evidence discussed above address or fail to address internal- and external-validity
threats that argue against a causal conclusion. The indicia give names to many
validity concerns discussed above.
As we noted above, Bradford Hill developed these indicia as a way to
assess epidemiological results.103 Where there is statistical evidence of an elevated
risk of a disease among those exposed to a substance, the indicia were intended to
aid in assessing whether a connection was causal.104 That is, Bradford Hill thought
of the indicia as a helpful way for assessing general causation in one particular area
of research: epidemiology. In this Article, we use the guidelines to assess causation
evidence arising from the multiple strands of investigation discussed above. The
quality and quantity of data on general causation often directly influence the ability
99.
Frédéric B. Piel, Martin H. Steinberg & David C. Rees, Sickle Cell Disease,
376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1561 (2017).
100.
For example, an important chemical in cigarette smoke, Benzo[a]pyrene
(BaP), has been shown by in vitro studies to damage the p53 “tumor suppressor” gene that
senses if a cell is dividing uncontrollably and tells the cell to die. This laboratory evidence
was later confirmed in people in an epidemiological study, which concluded that “p53
mutations in lung cancer from smokers carry highly significant fingerprints of exposure to
tobacco components, especially BaP.” See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 25.29.
101.
The legal literature contains several versions of the Bradford Hill list. See
Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 600 (3d ed. 2011).
102.
Hill, supra note 15. References to the criteria appear in over 120 legal opinions
on causation. Some references build a substantial part of their argument around the criteria.
See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 473–74 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Gannon
v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 2d 615, 624 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
103.
Some courts prefer to restrict their use to the assessment of epidemiology for
fear that otherwise they will be used as a multifactor test employed to support predetermined
conclusions. See In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 387 F.
Supp. 3d 323, 347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). This is a legitimate concern, and we do not mean to
suggest that all one needs to do to achieve admissibility is to invoke one or more of these
indicia. For a useful discussion of this point, see In re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) and Cialis
(Tadalafil) Products Liability Litigation, 424 F. Supp. 3d 781, 797–99 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(Bradford Hill criteria must be applied reliably).
104.
Haack, supra note 46, at 275; Frank Woodside & Allison Davis, The Bradford
Hill Criteria: The Forgotten Predicate, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 103 (2013); Raymond
Richard Neutra et al., The Use and Misuse of Bradford Hill in U.S. Tort Law, 8 JURIMETRICS
J. 127 (2018).
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to assert specific causation, and therefore the Bradford Hill indicia are useful in that
context as well. In the legal context, and in specific cases, some of the indicia will
be more important than others. It is important to emphasize that these factors are
meant to be used as indicia or touchstones of causation. They can only assist a
court’s (or a jury’s) judgment about general causation, not provide a definitive
answer to that important question. These indicia are strength, consistency,
specificity, temporality, biological gradient, plausibility, coherence, experiment,
and analogy.105
1. Strength of the Relationship
A body of epidemiologic evidence showing a strong relationship between
a purported cause and its effect suggests causation because a strong correlation
makes it less likely that plausible confounders explain a relationship. 106 This is
especially the case if several studies on different populations demonstrate a strong
relationship. If the size of an effect is great enough, one may even argue that it is
greater than the combined effect of plausible other causes.
When the strength of a relationship is modest, caution must be taken in
interpreting the results. This is especially true in those case-control studies where
the cases and controls are not drawn from the same defined population at risk for
the outcome under investigation and, therefore, where internal validity threats such
as selection bias and information bias may cast doubt on a causal interpretation.107
At the other extreme, when a substantial body of epidemiologic evidence fails to
find a substantial relationship, other evidence is unlikely to lead to the conclusion
that there is a causal relationship. We elaborate on this point in the consistency
discussion below.
A different and more complex strength question is posed when there is no
epidemiologic evidence. Without epidemiologic or other human evidence, externalvalidity threats become much more significant due to the uncertainty of
extrapolations from doses used in vivo and in vitro studies to human dose
equivalents. To this we must add the external-validity threats arising from crossspecies comparisons and, in the case of in vitro research, the lack of any metabolism
effects. All of this points to the underlying fact that the strength of a relationship is
of limited use in resolving external-validity threats due to possible effect
modification by variables that differ between the populations or circumstances that
have been studied and the ones targeted for inference. It is important to note that
because many animal studies are true experiments, even more modest size effects

105.
These indicia are not always mutually exclusive and may overlap in some
circumstances.
106.
Jeremy Howick et al., The Evolution of Evidence Hierarchies: What Can
Bradford Hill’s ‘Guidelines For Causation’ Contribute?, 102(5) J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 186,
187 (2009). This presumes that we have attempted to control for plausible confounders. When
we fail to do so, even strong correlations may be misleading. See Kenneth J. Rothman &
Sander Greenland, Causation and Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
144 (2005).
107.
Noel Weiss, General Concepts in Epidemiology, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra
note 11, § 23.37.
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are likely to be causal, and even with respect to nonexperimental research, the
greater the strength of a relationship the more likely the observed effect is causal.
2. Consistency
Consistency problems arise when studies of a similar type present mixed
results. This may occur, for example, in epidemiologic research when some studies
find substantial and statistically significant correlations between a substance and an
injury while others do not, perhaps because they involved different populations.108
Replication of early findings, ideally with improved methods, is a step most
epidemiologists require before they would be comfortable with a causal
interpretation of such a relationship.109 However, in defining consistency, one must
be careful to distinguish between differences in the actual effects suggested by data
and differences in statistical significance of the observed effects in different studies,
which may arise solely due to differences in sample sizes or measurement precision.
To replace comparisons of observed relationships in different studies with
comparisons of their p-values is a serious inferential error.
Consistency is also an indicium of causation when studies in one discipline,
e.g., epidemiology, are consistent with studies in another area, e.g., in vivo studies.
When a substance produces similar injuries in humans, as measured by
epidemiologic research, and in vivo studies, this lends support to a causal
interpretation. Contrariwise, lack of consistency or a failure to find a relationship
across areas of study may be persuasive that there is no causal relationship—though
lack of consistency must be interpreted with some caution.
Lack of consistency across domains of investigation requires a somewhat
more extensive discussion when the apparent inconsistency involves epidemiologic
research. Epidemiologic evidence may disagree with other evidence in two ways.
First, it may be difficult to find an animal model that replicates the harm a substance
does to humans. Recall the first animal model to be exposed to thalidomide did not
suffer the limb-reduction defects typical of human fetus exposure. 110 Thus, the
existence of consistency across disciplines supports a causal interpretation, but a
lack of consistency does not necessarily provide strong evidence against a causal
interpretation with respect to living humans.
Second, there may be evidence of harm to cells in an in vitro study or to
some animal-toxicology models but a body of epidemiological work that fails to

108.
See, e.g., Pritchard v. Dow Agro Scis., 705 F. Supp. 2d 471, 488–89 (W.D. Pa.
2010), aff’d, 430 Fed. App’x 102 (3d Cir. 2011).
109.
There are other ways to increase our confidence that there is a causal
relationship. If a group of studies suggest a relationship, but the results in some studies are
not statistically significant, meta-analyses may confirm a relationship that may have been too
small to be detected in individual studies. See MICHAEL BORENSTEIN, INTRODUCTION TO
META-ANALYSIS (2009).
110.
See supra p. 25. Similarly, there apparently has been only partial success in
finding animal models that mimic human response to inhaled tobacco smoke. Stephen S.
Hecht, Carcinogenicity Studies of Inhaled Cigarette Smoke in Laboratory Animals: Old and
New, 26(9) CARCINOGENESIS 1488 (2005).
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reveal an injury to humans, as is the case with saccharin exposure. 111 Where
epidemiological studies consistently fail to find a relationship between a relevant
exposure and disease and an expert attempts to rely on other research to prove
causation, most courts explicitly or implicitly adopt a hierarchy-of-evidence
approach with epidemiologic (and clinical trial) evidence at the top of the hierarchy.
Plaintiffs cannot proceed by ignoring these findings. This was the case in both the
Bendectin litigation and the connective-tissue-disease, silicone-breast-implant
litigation. 112 Similar positions have been adopted with respect to other exposures as
well.113
3. Specificity
This indicium is thought by some to be the least diagnostic.114 This is true
if one understands specificity to mean that a causal relationship is stronger when a
single putative cause produces a single specific effect. As many have noted, at least
when we are looking for the effects of causes, the absence of this type of specificity
does not undermine a causal conclusion. Cigarette smoke causes many diseases, and
many of those diseases themselves have other causes.115
There are other ways to understand this indicium that are more helpful. The
“second law” of toxicology concerns the specificity of toxic effects of individual
substances. Harmful substances generally cause a limited range of specific injuries.
For example, Vioxx, and to a lesser extent all NSAIDs116 appear to have the potential
to cause heart attacks and strokes but apparently not other injuries such as cancer.117
As mechanistic toxicology acquires better understanding of the biological processes
that produce an injury, and as toxicogenomics uncovers other biomarkers of
exposure, specificity promises to take on additional importance as an indicium of
causation.118 Specificity also plays a role in animal studies. Animals exposed to a
111.
NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (PB2000107509) (9th ed. 2000). This and other examples of
differences in metabolic processing of a chemical in the animal species and in humans
demonstrate that positive carcinogenicity bioassays in rodents certainly suggest further
research is needed. But one must guard against hasty extrapolations to humans before there
is evidence that the animal in question and humans share similar biological mechanisms. Of
course, the case for a human effect is much stronger if there are significant effects in several
animal species and strains of laboratory animals.
112.
See Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005).
113.
See Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474
(M.D.N.C. 2006); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 2006); Blackwell v.
Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 264 (Md. 2009); In re Accutane Litig., 191 A.3d 560, 592 (N.J. 2018).
114.
Neutra et al., supra note 104.
115.
Cigarette smoke is a complicated example because it is comprised of many
chemicals with separate effects. But other substances for which this is not the case—e.g.,
alcohol and asbestos—also produce a variety of injuries.
116.
NSAIDs are nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.
117.
Michele Bally et al., Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction with Real‐World
NSAIDs Depends on Dose and Timing of Exposure, 27(1) PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG
SAFETY 69 (2018).
118.
See Noel Weiss, Can the Specificity of an Association be Rehabilitated as a
Basis for Supporting a Causal Hypothesis?, 13 EPIDEMIOLOGY 6 (2002).
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toxic substance may suffer injuries different from those suffered by humans.119 The
discovery of a specific mechanism of injury may explain species differences.
Although Bradford Hill meant for specificity to refer to the injury caused
by a substance, in the legal context it may also be useful to think of specificity more
broadly as pertaining to the relationship between the individual’s circumstance and
the research cited in support of a causal relationship. This raises considerations of
external validity. The subjects in a study may have been exposed to a substance
somewhat different from the substance to which the plaintiff was exposed. 120
Specificity may also relate to dosage. The level of exposure to which an individual
is exposed may differ from the exposure level in relevant research.121
Specificity is inherently a problem with in vivo and in vitro research
because of external-validity problems. Nevertheless, many courts have stated that a
person does not need epidemiologic evidence to show general causation. 122 This
situation arises where experimentation is precluded due to ethical or other reasons
and when it is also difficult to conduct epidemiologic research with sufficient
statistical power due to the rarity of the disease in question. 123 However, large
samples are not always necessary for successful and important epidemiologic
research.124
The absence of epidemiological evidence, however, does not mean that any
toxicologic evidence will suffice. Animal studies usually pose fewer externalvalidity problems than some other types of toxicological data, and courts are more
likely to reject evidence that is based solely on in vitro studies or on a structureactivity analysis.125 However, courts are rarely confronted with pure in vitro cases
119.
General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997).
120.
General Electric v. Joiner provides an example. Some subjects in one of the
epidemiology studies referred to in the opinion had been exposed to mineral oil, and the study
did not mention PCBs. Id. at 145–46.
121.
When courts do exclude an expert’s testimony that is based in part on
epidemiological research, it is almost always the case that the study or studies in question fail
on one or more of the aforementioned factors. See, e.g., Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing
Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 68 Fed. App’x 356 (3d Cir. 2003)
(exposure to different chemical); Est. of Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.
Kan. 1997), aff’d, 165 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1999) (outcome was a different disease).
122.
This position was affirmed by three different circuits in cases involving
Parlodel. See Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001); Hollander
v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002); Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp.,
295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002); Dunn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672
(M.D.N.C. 2003); see also In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800 (N.D.
Ohio 2004), aff’d, 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., 803 F.
Supp. 2d 712 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
123.
See McClellan v. I-Flow Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1114, (D. Or. 2010).
124.
Arthur L. Herbst et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of
Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumour Appearance in Young Women, 284(16) NEW ENG.
J. MED. 878 (1971); Peter B. Imrey et al., Outbreak of Serogroup C Meningococcal Disease
Associated with Campus Bar Patronage, 143(6) AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 624 (1996).
125.
See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005);
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff’d, 295
F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
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because it is unlikely that a toxicologist would conclude that a substance caused
harm to individuals based solely on this type of research.
4. Temporality
Temporality is a universally accepted indicium. Indeed, the existence of a
temporal order—the effect must follow the putative cause—is generally thought to
be an essential criterion before one can attribute causation.126 Three caveats are in
order. First, some cross-sectional research designs make it difficult to assess
temporal order. 127 Second, the fact that a putative cause precedes an effect is
generally not, by itself, persuasive evidence of a causal relationship. In the next Part
we shall see that many courts have rejected expert testimony that seems to rely
exclusively on the fact that the alleged cause preceded the effect. Third, even though
an effect may follow an alleged cause, it may follow too soon or too late for the
alleged cause to be plausible as the cause, based on existing research. No one
contracts mesothelioma one year after exposure to asbestos.128 One year after that
exposure would be too soon to become sick from that disease, and so asbestos
exposure one year prior to onset of mesothelioma would not plausibly be causal for
that illness.129
5. Biological Gradient
The first “law of toxicology,” that the dose makes the poison, implies
among other things that the incidence and/or the severity of the disease increases as
exposure rises. This indicium is met when a greater exposure leads to a more serious
manifestation of a disease. This is the case, for example, with the level of exposure
to asbestos and the severity of an individual’s asbestosis. The criteria are also met
when a substance causes a disease, such as mesothelioma, that does not vary in its
severity but that does occur with greater frequency as the level of exposure
increases.130 The apparent complete absence of a biological gradient in either of
these senses generally argues against causation, with the caveat that a sufficiently
wide range of doses must have been studied.131
As we noted above, with respect to many exposures and many types of
injury, it is commonly thought that there is some threshold dose below which the
substance does not cause harm. Recall that toxicology research typically attempts to
126.
For a case where temporal order is unclear, see Guinn v. AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals LP, 602 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010).
127.
For example, if in a study conducted at a single point in time, we observe that
individuals taking a certain antipsychotic drug have a higher suicide rate than individuals not
taking the drug, we cannot know if the drug caused suicide or whether suicidal tendencies are
the reason these individuals began taking the drug. To sort out this question, we need studies
that observe people over time.
128.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.24.
129.
The second and third caveats are particularly relevant when we turn to the
problem of specific causation. We discuss them further there.
130.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.24 (providing an example of a doseresponse relationship figure).
131.
There may be situations, however, where the range of exposure in the research
is too narrow to detect a dose–response relationship that would emerge if there were a greater
range of exposures.
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estimate the dosage below which there is no observable effect. Similarly,
epidemiological research may indicate adverse effects for higher-dose exposure but
no significant effect for those exposed to lower doses. This can reflect a true
threshold effect or just insufficient sample sizes to detect low-dose effects but
regardless causes expert-testimony admissibility problems for plaintiffs exposed to
lower doses.132 However as we noted above, with respect to some substance/injury
relationships, it is thought that there is no safe threshold.133 Cancer is the injury for
which it is most frequently thought that there is no safe threshold, but even here the
mechanism of injury may lead to a different conclusion.134
6. Plausibility
A useful way of thinking about biological plausibility is to ask whether a
hypothesis that a certain exposure causes a certain disease makes sense given what
we know about other exposures and other injuries and about the biological
mechanisms through which an exposure causes an injury. Plausibility is perhaps
most useful as an exclusionary criterion. For example, a teratogen cannot cause
certain types of fetal injuries if there is persuasive evidence that it cannot cross the
placental barrier.
Plausibility has several dimensions. Plausibility is often a question when
discussing in vivo research. A human injury is more plausible if we observe injuries
in animals experiencing a similar exposure.135 Plausibility is also an issue when one
compares exposure to one substance with exposures to other substances with a
similar chemical structure. If the other substances are known to cause injury, this
lends some credence to the possibility that the substance under consideration also
may cause such injuries. Often, however, this so-called “structure activity” evidence
is of limited probative value. Recall the earlier discussion in footnote 70 of the
different carcinogenetic effects of benzene, toluene, and xylene.136 Understanding
why these differences exist provides an example of perhaps the most frequent use
of plausibility evidence today: proposing the biological mechanism by which an
exposure causes injury.

132.
In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp.
2d 1166, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (distinguishing between a 200 mg/d dose of Celebrex and a
400 mg/d dose; excluding expert testimony that the lower daily dose could cause heart attacks
and strokes but permitting expert to testify that the higher daily dosage could cause these
injuries); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 174
F. Supp. 3d 911 (D.S.C. 2016) (permitting plaintiff’s epidemiologists to testify that 80 mg/d
of Lipitor could cause Type 2 diabetes but excluding as unreliable their testimony that 10
mg/d could do so).
133.
For a discussion of extrapolations when we believe there is no threshold dose,
see FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 22.29.
134.
See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the EPA’s assumption that there is no safe threshold with respect to
carcinogenic effects of chloroform in drinking water).
135.
Here, the nature of the exposure and the injury play a role as was the case in
the mouse study discussed in the Supreme Court’s Joiner opinion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997).
136.
See supra note 70.
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Plaintiffs frequently offer evidence of this type of biological plausibility to
support their causal argument. For example, in In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales
Practices, and Products Liability Litigation,137 the plaintiffs alleged that they, or
their decedents, suffered suicide-related injuries when their physicians prescribed
the anti-epileptic drug Neurontin. An important part of their argument was that the
drug reduced serotonergic levels, a known correlate with mood changes and
depression. The court agreed that this analysis strengthened the plaintiffs’ case.138
It is worth noting, however, that the plaintiffs had other, more direct
epidemiologic evidence of a correlation between antiepileptic drugs and suicide.
When other, more direct evidence is unavailable, biologic-plausibility evidence has
been found to be less persuasive.139
7. Coherence
Coherence refers to whether the causal hypothesis is supported by or is in
conflict with other facts about the history and distribution of the illness. The
coherence indicium often overlaps with the plausibility indicium. In cases, the terms
often seem to be used interchangeably to discuss things such as whether an
epidemiologic research finding is supported by similar results in animal studies. As
is the case with biologic plausibility, courts are most receptive to the use of this
guideline when there is other, more direct evidence of causation.140
8. Experiment
Bradford Hill’s comments about the experiment indicium seem framed in
terms of one particular quasi-experimental design, sometimes referred to as a
“challenge/dechallenge design.” Our belief that a substance caused an injury is
strengthened if the injury ceases when the cause is removed. Allergists frequently
use this design to test for what allergen is causing the patient’s symptoms.141 Of
course, this technique is useful only for acute responses that are reversible upon
withdrawal of a suspect cause.
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is useful to consider the whole
range of experimental designs—designs in which the exposure is systematically
manipulated by the researcher. Properly conducted, true experiments come closer
than other approaches to avoiding challenges to internal validity and supporting
causal explanations. While quasi-experiments are not as good in resolving internalvalidity issues, they are largely better than designs without any manipulation of the
137.
612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D. Mass. 2009).
138.
Id. at 158. The plaintiffs in this case also argued for biological plausibility
based on in vitro and in vivo research and because the active ingredient had a chemical
structure similar to other antiepileptic drugs. Id. at 145–48.
139.
In several cases, courts have stated that plausibility arguments, standing alone,
are insufficient to support a causation conclusion in the absence of evidence showing a
relevant association between an exposure and an injury. Some of these cases are discussed in
In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability
Litigation, 174 F. Supp. 3d 911 (D.S.C. 2016). Such a conclusion turns, however, on the
quality of mechanism evidence supporting an expert’s conclusion.
140.
See id.
141.
Jinoos Yazdany et al., Allergy Testing, in CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT 20–55 (Maxine A. Papadakis et al. eds., 2021).
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alleged cause.142 But causal inferences from even the best experiments may be open
to external-validity threats.
9. Analogy
Are there known causal relationships of similar exposures to similar
illnesses? The probative value of this indicium turns on both similarity of the
substances and the similarity of the injury.143 The idea of analogy may fit many other
situations as well. All use of animal studies to show human causation could be
thought of as an argument by analogy.
In summary, and to repeat our cautionary comments at the outset of this
Part, these nine indicia are very far from litmus tests of general causation. Even the
strongest correlation can be spurious, and the importance of factors such as
consistency may turn on the exact nature of an inconsistency. However, the presence
or absence of indicia do properly influence our willingness to believe a relationship
is causal. They do so because they alter the vulnerability of a body of data to
alternative explanations from internal and external validity threats. As this
discussion also demonstrates, the indicia are not of equal importance in helping one
make a causal attribution. Temporal order is essential. Experiment, strength, and
consistency are also often key. Plausibility will play an increasingly important role
with a firmer understanding of the precise biological mechanisms by which a
substance causes an illness. In many situations, the absence of a biological gradient
can be an important indicium arguing against a causal conclusion. As we discuss
below, these and the other Bradford Hill indicia may play quite similar roles in
specific causation inquiries.

IV. RULING OUT: SPECIFIC CAUSATION
The third step in the three-step process of differential etiology is using
“standard diagnostic techniques by which doctors normally rule out alternative
causes” to reach a conclusion as to which cause is most likely.144 General causation
addresses the issue of whether a substance can cause the plaintiff’s condition;
specific causation addresses the issue of whether the substance in question did cause
the plaintiff’s condition. We agree with the reference manual’s statement that the
logic of Step Three is sound: “[E]liminating other known and competing causes
increases the probability that a given individual’s disease was caused by exposure
to the agent.”145 However, therein lies the problem. While courts set forth the logic
of differential etiology, they offer no real guidance about the details of Step Three.146

142.
On the general topic of quasi-experimental designs, see DONALD T. CAMPBELL
& JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL & QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH
(1963); THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN &
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD TESTING (1979).
143.
Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 515 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
144.
Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 179 (6th Cir. 2009).
145.
Green et al., supra note 101, at 617.
146.
By our count, over 70 cases have repeated the phrase “standard diagnostic
techniques,” but they do not provide any overall guidance as to the method one should use in
ruling out alternative causes.
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This is not to say that the courts have no concept of a good or a bad
differential-etiology analysis. Many opinions provide coherent discussions as to
whether an expert has good grounds for a differential etiology. What is lacking is a
systematic approach for assessing the merits of a differential etiology.
Perhaps it goes without saying that in a post-Daubert world an expert must
present some justification for her opinion. Under the older Frye rule,147 some courts
explicitly permit an expert to testify as to specific causation based solely on her
opinion or “clinical experience.”148 One import of the Daubert line of cases is that
this type of ipse dixit will not do. What then constitutes an acceptable analysis?
Recall that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence149 now requires that
expert testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data, and that the testimony
be the product of reliable principles and methods. In the specific-causation context,
the rule thus imposes two requirements: sufficient data with which to reach a
conclusion that the substance under question is the cause of the plaintiff’s injury
and, equally important, a reliable method to address the effects of alternative
possible causes.
This Part uses the Bradford Hill indicia and an analysis of validity to flesh
out these two requirements and to provide a systematic approach to those factors
that courts should consider in assessing specific causation. In short, what Bradford
Hill did for general causation in epidemiology we hope to do for specific causation.
As is the case in our earlier general-causation discussion, these indicia are meant as
guidelines. Strength in certain dimensions can make up for weaknesses in others,
but there is no algorithm that points to a certain conclusion. Throughout this Part we
will make occasional references to the admissibility of specific-causation testimony.
It is worthwhile to emphasize several key caveats at the start. First, if both
of the first steps of differential etiology are not satisfied—correct diagnosis and
general causation—there can be no specific-causation determination. The great
majority of courts agree on this point. 150 Second, as discussed in greater detail
below, what is known about general causation—both as to the cause to be ruled-in
as well as to the alternative cause(s) to be ruled-out—has a direct impact on what
might be said about specific causation. Third, as noted, these specific-causation
guidelines are just that: guides to informed decision-making on what is almost
invariably a task fraught with uncertainty. Finally, although scientific reasoning can
help reduce this uncertainty, the question of where to set the uncertainty threshold
for admission of evidence as proof is a question of policy as well as science. We
consider this point in Part V.

147.
The Frye rule is named after the opinion in Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), which established the “general acceptance” test for admissibility.
148.
See, e.g., Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan. 2000);
Marsh v. Valyou, 917 So. 2d 313, 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), review granted, 940 So. 2d
1125 (Fla. 2006), decision quashed, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
149.
See supra note 9 (providing the full text of Rule 702).
150.
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 21.6.
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A. Specificity of Cause and Condition
The specific-causation inquiry requires us to focus on the causes of effects.
This analysis poses special problems. A typical tort example may help illustrate the
nature of the difficulty.
Suppose Ann took the drug benfluorex as an appetite suppressant. At some
later time, she develops valvular heart disease. In her case, and in each case where
an individual is suing the source of the injury, we know that she has been exposed
to the proposed cause, and we know she has suffered the relevant effect. Did the
exposure cause the disease? When there are no other putative causes under
consideration, the “cause of an effect” question may be stated as follows: “If Ann
had not taken benfluorex, and other things being equal, would she still have
developed valvular heart disease?”151 This can also be phrased as addressing, in
terms of formal logic, the question of causal necessity and, equivalently in legal
terms, the “but for” assertion: “But for the benfluorex, Ann would not have
developed valvular heart disease.” The answer requires a form of counterfactual
reasoning because we cannot observe the alternative, i.e., the situation where Ann
did not take benfluorex.
Resolving the specific causation question resolves down to a set of
questions. First, even when there is only one “cause” under consideration, e.g.,
benfluorex, what is the evidence supporting the argument that Ann’s outcome is an
instance of the alleged causal relationship rather than an unrelated natural
(“idiopathic”) development? Second, in the common scenario where there are
competing rival causes, what is the evidence supporting the argument that Ann’s
injury is an instance of some other causal relationship, such as a family history of
valvular heart disease? Intuitively, causal determination turns on the comparative
likelihood that her injury is a consequence of the alleged cause versus other potential
causes. However, in the presence of multiple possible causes, it is not clear how to
assess these likelihoods: in particular, using the “but for” approach for each cause
may well implicate several of the possible causes simultaneously. In consequence,
when “probabilities of causation” for the different suspected causes are computed
based on this approach, they may well sum to more than one.
Both as a matter of common sense and scientific research, there are
circumstances in which there is an overwhelming basis for connecting a cause to a
specific condition. When someone with two healthy legs is involved in a car accident
and emerges with a broken leg, we can be fairly confident that the accident was the
cause.152 Simply put, in the calculation of ruling-in one cause and ruling-out others,
if there are no plausible causes to rule-out, specific causation is easier.
The cases where there are most likely to be no viable alternative causes are
those involving an immediate effect following an exposure. In Heller v. Shaw
151.
The example is taken from Dawid & Musio, What Can Group Level Data Tell
Us About Individual Causality?, in STATISTICS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST—IN MEMORY OF
STEPHEN E. FIENBERG (A. Carriquiry et al. eds., Springer 2021).
152.
See Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 2001); Marcum v.
Adventist Health Sys./W., 193 P.3d 1, 2 (Or. 2008) (en banc); McClellan v. I-Flow Corp.,
710 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1094–95 (D. Or. 2010).
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Industries, Inc., Judge Becker focused on this aspect of the temporal relationship
dimension of toxic tort cases.153 When an acute exposure is immediately followed
by an injury with no other plausible causes, courts are much more likely to permit
an expert to testify as to specific causation based in large part on temporal order.
Specific causation most often becomes problematic when there is a significant
passage of time between exposure and the emergence of an injury.
Even when the injury does not immediately follow exposure, there are
cases where a specific-causation determination is straightforward due to the absence
of other plausible causes. One well-known group of such cases are those that involve
so-called signature diseases. The two best known signature diseases in the toxic tort
arena are two ailments that arise from exposure to asbestos: asbestosis and
mesothelioma. The former only occurs due to asbestos exposure, and while there are
mesothelioma cases where there has been no known asbestos exposure, such cases
are very rare.154 When an individual presents with one of these diseases, it is almost
certainly due to asbestos exposure.155 However, outside the asbestos arena, signature
diseases are quite rare, and the signature-disease approach to specific causation is
virtually never applied to other ailments.156
For some illnesses that are not signature diseases, determining etiology
may still be relatively straightforward. In some cases, researchers can use
experimental or quasi-experimental methods to exclude other causes in the
individual case. An allergist, for instance, can experiment with different allergens to
identify the offending substance or substances. 157 In other cases, confidence in
specificity is gained when all other plausible causes are convincingly ruled out.158
The cases discussed above are easier to resolve: if there is evidence of
general causation, the injury is likely a consequence of the alleged cause because
instances in which the same injury is associated with other causes are so much rarer.
In more complex circumstances, cases become more difficult.

153.
167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
154.
Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 51 (Pa. 2012)
155.
The asbestos cases do pose difficult causal questions because there are often
multiple potential defendants whose product may have injured the plaintiff. In these
situations, there is no question about the cause, but there are very difficult questions of
whether a particular defendant’s product should constitute a legal cause of the injury. See
Joseph Sanders, The “Every Exposure” Cases & the Beginning of the Asbestos Endgame, 88
TUL. L. REV. 1153 (2014).
156.
They do include silicosis (caused by breathing tiny bits of silica) and
manganism, a disease caused by exposure to manganese. See Betsy J. Grey & Gary E.
Marchant, Biomarkers, Concussions, and the Duty of Care, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1911,
1926 (2015). Note that research suggests that traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) is a signature
disease caused by repetitive head injuries. Vaginal adenocarcinoma in young women appears
to be a signature disease associated with maternal use of DES.
157.
Yazdany et al., supra note 141, at 20–55.
158.
See Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 470, 498 (D.N.J. 2002);
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 688 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Tedder v. Am.
Railcar Indus., Inc., 739 F.3d 1104, 1108–09 (8th Cir. 2014).
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B. The Strength of the Relationship Between a “Cause” and an “Effect”: Forms
of Empirical Proof
In this and the following Section we discuss situations where inferences
about specific causation necessarily depend on the foundation of empirical work that
supports general causation, including clinical trials, epidemiological research,
various areas of toxicology, and genetic information. Each type of evidence must,
however, be assessed for internal and external validity.159
Assuming adequate validity, one important question is when, if ever,
general-causation results might directly imply specific causation. The most
frequently discussed example is presented when there is a body of on-point
epidemiology demonstrating a relative risk greater than 2.0, implying that if this
relative risk accurately reflects causal mechanisms, then the fraction of new cases
among exposed persons actually resulting from this exposure (or in epidemiological
jargon, the true “attributable fraction among the exposed” or “individual attributable
fraction”) exceeds one half. 160 Scholars have long debated whether proof of a
relative risk greater than 2.0 is sufficient to prove specific causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.161 Courts have been receptive to this assertion,162
and we agree that theoretically this intuition has appeal.163
But before jumping to the somewhat simplistic, albeit intuitive, view that a
doubling of the risk supports a more-probable-than-not determination, the twin
pillars of validity—internal and external—must be evaluated. As regards internal
validity, we must emphasize that any statistical statement is only as good as the
research methods used to obtain it. A relative risk greater than 2.0 is less persuasive
if there is only a single study supporting it; if the methods used in multiple studies
suffer from significant validity problems; if other bodies of research, such as
toxicological studies, fail to support the underlying plausibility of the cause-and-

159.
Suppose researchers publish a study that purports to show that illness X is
uniquely associated with substance Y. A close read of the article, however, indicates that the
researchers studied only male subjects (of whom there were only a small number) and failed
to employ double-blind methods, limited the number of illnesses evaluated, employed lessthan-ideal-statistical methods, and no other researchers had yet replicated their results. The
claim of individuality would be severely undermined by the validity threats associated with
the general research program.
160.
By “on-point,” we mean to exclude studies that present substantial internaland/or external-validity threats.
161.
See Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997). See
generally Susan Haack, Risky Business: Statistical Proofs of Specific Causation, in EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, & TRUTH IN THE LAW (2014); Carruth & Goldstein, supra note
91, at 203–04.
162.
See, e.g., Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d
584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir.
1995); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997); In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 893 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Est. of George
v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 375 (2010); Johnson & Johnson Talcum
Powder Cases, 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
163.
See Dawid et al., supra note 8, at 374–78; A. Philip Dawid et al., From
Statistical Evidence to Evidence of Causality, 11(3) BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 725 (2016).
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effect claim; or if the lower confidence bound for the true relative risk from a
comprehensive meta-analysis falls well below 2.0.
As regards external validity, a pivotal issue in making specific causation
judgments is whether the extant research can be applied to the individual in question.
An obvious instance of this issue is whether a demonstrated effect in mouse studies
can be applied to humans; a less obvious instance is whether a doubling of risk in
studies of human adults can be applied to children.
A more difficult situation arises when epidemiologic data strongly suggest
general causation but with relative risk below 2.0, so that the observed individual
attributable fraction is below one half. Judge Kozinski argued in his Daubert remand
opinion that a relative risk below 2.0 suggests it is less likely than not that the
plaintiff’s injury was caused by the substance in question.164 Some courts have made
a relative risk greater than 2.0 a litmus test for admissibility. The most extreme
version of this approach may be found in the Texas Vioxx case, Merck & Co. v.
Garza,165 but Garza is not alone.166 Only a few courts have adopted this bright-line
rule, and this unqualified position is open to question. While statistical analyses
provide support for a court’s inclination to regard a relative risk above 2.0 as meeting
the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of persuasion, the opposite is not
the case. A finding that a relative risk falls short of 2.0 does not necessarily imply
that the probability of causation is less than one half. This is because relative risk
does not determine probability of causation but only a lower bound for it. 167
Moreover, statistical statements such as relative risk and p-values constitute an
important component but only one part of the research process: they cannot be used
alone as talismans of admissibility, and their relevance to the admissibility decision
is not straightforward. 168 For example, one can legitimately question whether an
odds ratio of 1.9 or 2.1 is as meaningful when found only in case-control studies.
Compare this to a 2.1 relative risk in cohort studies, which are generally less
susceptible to internal validity threats, and thus the cohort study results are usually
regarded, in principle and on balance, as better founded.169 However, the extent to

164.
43 F.3d at 1321.
165.
347 S.W.3d 256, 265–66 (Tex. 2011).
166.
See Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996).
167.
Dawid et al., supra note 8, at 377.
168.
Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on p-Values:
Context, Process, and Purpose, 70(2) AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016).
169.
For example, on the question of whether genital application of talc-based baby
powder causes ovarian cancer, compare Katie M. O’Brien et al., Association of Powder Use
in the Genital Area with Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 49 (2020) (a largepooled cohort study), with Kathryn L. Terry et al., Genital Powder Use and Risk of Ovarian
Cancer: A Pooled Analysis of 8,525 Cases and 9,859 Controls, 6(8) CANCER PREVENTION
RSCH. 811 (2013) (a case-control study), and Ross Penninkilampi & Guy D. Eslick, Perineal
Talc Use & Ovarian Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGY 41
(2018) (primarily based upon case-control studies). The latter two studies may suffer from
some recall bias. See Britton Trabert, Body Powder & Ovarian Cancer Risk—What is The
Role of Recall Bias?, 25(10) CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1369
(2016).
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which a research design achieves its potential is determined by how well the design
is executed.
Given these caveats, how may courts address this situation? Several
approaches are available, sometimes in combination. Each employ one or more
Bradford Hill indicia. First, it may be possible to demonstrate that the plaintiff was
exposed to a larger dose or a greater exposure than the subjects in the studies, and
an expert might conclude that, had the subjects been exposed at this level, the
relative risk would have been greater than the relative risk threshold of 2.0. Of
course, the opposite may be true, in which case the best estimate of the strength of
the relationship between exposure and injury in those exposed to the same level as
the plaintiff would be lower than observed in the research. In this situation, even if
epidemiologic research indicated a relative risk greater than 2.0, if the plaintiff’s
exposure were significantly less, then one may reasonably conclude that the relative
risk for this individual is less than 2.0. If the exposure is small enough, one may
even conclude there is negligible evidence of general causation.170
A second approach, recognizing the indeterminacy of any estimate of the
strength of a relationship, allows some relaxation of the 2.0 relative-risk threshold.
Courts may allow testimony based on epidemiological research that all agree
supports a relative risk of 1.9. 171 This approach takes into account that the true
population value of the relative risk is never exactly known, but only estimated
within a range of accuracy that may generally be represented by a confidence
interval, standard-error estimate, 172 or Bayesian credible interval. 173 This is
especially true if one can point to aspects of the epidemiologic studies, such as a
potential misclassification error that could have led to an attenuation of the
relationship.174 Of course, this approach is inappropriate if the relative risk is small,

170.

See Merck, 347 S.W.3d at 266. Mr. Garza took 25mg a day of Vioxx for 25

days.
171.
In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We
agree with the Third Circuit that the validity of a claim should not depend on whether a
plaintiff was exposed to a fraction of a rem lower than the “doubling dose.”); see also Grassis
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 676 (N.J. Super. 1991).
172.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 23:39.
173.
A Bayesian credible interval is an interval including a specified fraction, e.g.,
95%, of the posterior probability distribution of an unknown parameter of a population or
process, conditional on a presumed (prior) probability distribution of that parameter and on
data observed from other probability distribution(s) indexed by that parameter. A 95%
confidence interval, in contrast, is a one-sided or two-sided interval from a data sample with
95% probability of bounding a fixed, unknown parameter, for which no nondegenerate
probability distribution is conceived, under specified assumptions about the data distribution.
These types of intervals, neither of which is unique, play analogous roles in Bayesian and
frequentist inference. They may under some conditions be numerically similar but have very
different philosophical bases. Credible intervals may alternatively be chosen to have
maximum posterior density, to center on the posterior mean, or to exclude equal posterior
probability at lower and upper ends. See EMMANUEL LESAFFRE & ANDREW B. LAWSON,
BAYESIAN BIOSTATISTICS 47–50 (2012).
174.
On the problem of misclassification, see JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON
TRIAL 80–82 (1998).
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e.g., 1.1 or 1.2, even if one is persuaded that such a small relative risk is admissible
evidence of general causation.175
Third, some courts have argued that a relative risk less than 2.0 may be
supplemented with other, non-epidemiological evidence of causation. 176 This
approach raises the question as to what sort of evidence could play this role? For
example, does the existence of toxicological evidence indicating that a substance
causes an injury in some mammals lend independent support to an expert’s causation
testimony in the face of epidemiological evidence indicating a relative risk less than
2.0? With respect to general causation, the answer is yes. The “third law” of
toxicology is that humans are animals, meaning that the study of animals can provide
useful insight into effects in humans.177 Such information speaks to several Bradford
Hill indicia, including consistency, plausibility, and coherence. With respect to
specific causation, however, the answer is more nuanced and turns in part on the
quality and relevance of the two types of studies. The argument for supplementing
epidemiology with evidence on other species is strengthened if one can point to
aspects of the epidemiologic research that could lead to an attenuation of the
relationship. The expert’s argument is also strengthened insofar as the substance and
injury are similar across species,178 an application of Bradford Hill’s consistency
indicium, and where there is mechanistic-toxicological evidence that describes a
toxic pathway shared by humans, a form of plausibility evidence. In sum, the
implications of this type of toxicological evidence for specific causation are best
framed in terms of their contributions to satisfying and deepening the relevance of
the Bradford Hill indicia for general causation to the specific case.179
There is no formula for when such toxicologic evidence can tip the scales
on the question of specific causation. One can say, however, that this type of
evidence is most helpful when epidemiologic research suffers from various types of
internal-validity threats or when the mechanism of injury is not well understood. It
is less helpful when the research on human subjects suffers from less-serious threats
to internal validity. The problem is that even well-designed toxicologic research
labors under external validity threats when applied to humans. There is no formula
for extrapolating the strength of an association in an in vivo experiment conducted
at relatively high dosage to the strength of a relationship between a substance and a
human illness at substantially lower dosages. If there is a large, well-designed body
175.
Note that this was the situation in the Bendectin cases. The best estimates of
relative risk or odds ratio were 1.1. Id. For a more recent case making the same point, see In
re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) and Cialis (Tadalafil) Products Liability Litigation, 424 F.
Supp. 3d 781, 788 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
176.
Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1992); In re Hanford, 292
F.3d at 1135–36.
177.
Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 77, at 401.
178.
See Xanthi Pedeli et al., Risk Assessment of Diesel Exhaust and Lung Cancer:
Combining Human and Animal Studies After Adjustment for Biases in Epidemiological
Studies, 10 ENV’T HEALTH 30 (2011) (discussing a method to combine animal and human
studies to produce a better estimate of risk); Douglas L. Weed, Weight of Evidence: A Review
of Concept and Methods, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1545 (2005).
179.
Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases, 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 671–72
(Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (providing a useful example of how an expert may supplement
epidemiologic studies having risk estimates less than 2.0 with other evidence).
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of on-point epidemiology indicating a small relative risk, e.g., 1.02, it is not clear
how any animal data could cause one to substantially alter the best estimate of a
human effect to reach a more-likely-than-not threshold.
Some genetic information may also prove useful in this situation. For legal
purposes, one must distinguish among markers of susceptibility, markers of an
injury, and markers of exposure.180
Recall also our earlier discussion of Bowen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
and Co., Inc.,181 where the plaintiff’s claim was badly compromised when it was
discovered she had a biomarker for an injury, CHARGE syndrome, different from
the injury she was claiming. This was a marker for a disease, not an exposure.
Biomarkers of disease can play an important part in cases where the diagnosis is in
dispute as it was in the Bowen case.182 But the Bowen diagnosis did more. It not only
specified the disease, but it also indicated that a genetic defect was the
overwhelmingly most-likely cause of the injury.
As in the Bowen case, the most useful biomarker would be one that would
allow us to define signature diseases. That is, the marker would be able to
differentiate injuries with known multiple causes into subsets within which everyone
with the injury and the marker is known to have been exposed to the same putative
cause. This does not guarantee there are no other potential causes of this effect, but
it would almost certainly be admissible evidence on specific causation.183
C. The Presence of Competing Factors
Thus far, we have focused on overly simplified situations where the
question is, with respect to a given putative cause, what evidence is available to say
that it is or is not more likely than not that the effect was produced by this cause? In
point of fact, of course, even when an opinion does not discuss other potential
causes, there are no cases (with the possible exception of signature diseases) where
we can be certain there is a single cause. In this next part of this Article, we introduce
other potential causes. These may come from many sources, including one’s genetic
makeup, lifestyle, preexisting health situation, or drug or other environmental
exposures, to give but some examples. Thus, a careful differential etiology must
often assess the strength of potential alternative causes of the plaintiff’s injury and,
if possible, how their combined effect alters the probability of an injury.
In this Part we offer some examples designed to suggest how courts might
proceed with this very difficult competing-cause issue. However, the toxicological
data currently available to us do not allow us to observe causal processes and
interactions between competing risks, and a complete understanding of how risks
180.
For a general discussion of biomarkers, see Gold, supra note 91.
181.
No. Civ. A. 97C-06-194 CH, 2005 WL 1952859 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23,
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 787 (Del. 2006).
182.
For a similar case, see Wintz ex rel. Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508
(7th Cir. 1997).
183.
Recall one plaintiff expert argued that in some unexplained way the fungicide
and the mutation acted together to cause her injury. If, in fact, the expert had evidence that
the phenotype of the gene was moderated by toxic exposure, a different result might be
justified.
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combine and interact is currently well beyond our reach. Again, we are left with
group data, but macro information about the frequencies of joint appearances in
epidemiological studies that we discuss below have serious limitations. In the
absence of a more complete understanding of this issue we, and the courts, must
proceed with some simplifying decision heuristics based on group data, tort rules,
and policy considerations.
1. Assessing the Strength and Interaction of Competing “Causes”
At the outset, we should note that one can imagine some easy cases where
alternative causes, although present, appear to be de minimus. If the choice of
whether one’s lung cancer was the result of a lifetime of heavy smoking or by a brief
encounter with a substance for which there is a significant but weak correlation with
lung cancer, in most situations it should be an easy task to rule out the other
substance as the specific cause of the individual’s injury. The issue becomes more
difficult when the other causes pose more significant threats.
Here is a simplified hypothetical example. Imagine an individual consumes
two pills together, each ingested once, and suffers an injury common to ingestion of
each pill. Suppose we have good data comparing the outcomes for those exposed to
each pill singly to the outcomes of those exposed to neither pill. The relative risk of
injury from pill one alone is 3.0. The relative risk of the same injury from pill two
alone is 6.0. In what way are the individual risks of 6.0 and 3.0 relevant to the
differential etiology of the individual exposed to both? The answer to this question
requires us to ask some additional questions.
An initial question is how risk factors combine and interact to affect the
probability of an injury. Combinations are typically examined using statistical
models in which either (a) the excess (“attributable”) risks or (b) the relative risks
produced by each component are presumed to be unaffected by the presence or
absence of other components. These presumptions imply that the total risk of a
combination is respectively the sum (additive model) or the product of the
contributions of its components (multiplicative model). In our example above, the
relative risk compared to unexposed individuals would be 1 + (6−1) + (3−1) = 8,
(risk differences add, similar to Fig 2 below) in an additive model and (6 × 3) = 18,
in a multiplicative model.
In the discussion of external validity, we introduced the idea of an effect
modifier: a variable that modifies the relationship between the alleged cause and
plaintiff’s condition. 184 Such additional factors that alter the strength of a
relationship between the risk factor under investigation and a particular injury are
not uncommon. “Synergism” and “antagonism” are terms used to describe
circumstances in which combinations of risk factors produce considerably greater
or weaker risks than their individual components would lead one to expect,185 but
the application of these terms depends on which model generates one’s expectations.
In our example, antagonism would exist if the joint effect is less than the sum of
each separately in an additive model or less than the product of each separately in a
184.
185.
661 (1997).

See supra p. 25.
John Darroch, Biologic Synergism and Parallelism, 145 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
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multiplicative model. A well-known example of a synergistic effect is the combined
effect of asbestos exposure and smoking on the likelihood of developing lung
cancer. For long-term smokers, the relative risk of developing lung cancer compared
to those who have never smoked is sometimes estimated to be in the range of 10.0.
For individuals substantially exposed to asbestos, the relative risk of developing
lung cancer compared to nonexposed individuals is in the range of 5.0.186 However,
if one is unfortunate enough to have been exposed to asbestos and to have been a
long-term smoker, the relative risk compared to those unexposed individuals who
have not smoked exceeds the sum of the relative risks. One possibility is that the
relationship is multiplicative, in the range of 50.0—i.e., a 49-fold risk increment.187
In this situation, the “joint effect” of the two combined exposures is greater than the
sum of the effects associated with each alone: one may view a four-fold increment
(RR=5) as due to asbestos exposure, a nine-fold increment (RR=10) as due to
smoking, and the remaining 49−4−9=36-fold increment as due to their joint effect.
Such a relationship would be synergistic on the additive scale because the additive
increase in lung cancer incidence due to either factor is substantially increased in the
presence of the other, but this is not true on the multiplicative scale. Were the
relationship purely multiplicative, the relative risk of either factor would be
unaffected by the presence of the other. Meta-analyses now tend to indicate that the
relationship is more than additive but less than fully multiplicative.188 This means
that the relative risk for nonsmokers exposed to asbestos is higher than the relative
risk for smokers who are exposed to asbestos.189 From a public-health perspective,
which stresses the additive model because that often best summarizes impact upon

186.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 26.25.
187.
Id.
188.
See Peter N. Lee, Relation Between Exposure to Asbestos and Smoking Jointly
and the Risk of Lung Cancer, 58(3) OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. 145 (2001) (data support
a multiplicative model); Darren Wraith & Kerrie Mengersen, Assessing the Combined Effect
of Asbestos Exposure & Smoking on Lung Cancer: A Bayesian Approach, 26(5) STATS. MED.
1150, 1150 (2007) (evidence supports more than an additive model and less than a
multiplicative relation); Gillian Frost et al., The Effect of Smoking on the Risk of Lung Cancer
Mortality for Asbestos Workers in Great Britain (1971–2005), 55(3) ANNALS OCCUPATIONAL
HYGIENE 239 (2011) (interaction is greater than additive but a multiplicative model could not
be ruled out); Yuwadee Ngamwong et al., Additive Synergism Between Asbestos and Smoking
in Lung Cancer Risk: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 10 PLOS ONE e0135798
(2015) (results point to a strong additive synergism for lung cancer with co-exposure of
asbestos and cigarette smoking).
189.
Geoffrey Berry & F.D.K. Liddell, The Interaction of Asbestos and Smoking in
Lung Cancer, 45(5) ANNALS OCCUPATIONAL HYGIENE 341 (2001) estimates that overall
nonsmokers have a relative risk of lung cancer due to asbestos that is 2.04 times that of
smokers. There is also some research on the association for smoking and a number of other
non-tobacco risk factors for cardiovascular disease. See Jay H. Lubin et al., Synergistic and
Non-Synergistic Associations for Cigarette Smoking & Non-Tobacco Risk Factors for
Cardiovascular Disease Incidence in the Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities (ARIC) Study,
19 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RSCH. 826 (2017).
The calculation of synergistic effects is fairly complex. Much of the writing
on this topic has to do with synergistic effects of drugs (where synergism is often a desirable
trait). See, e.g., Ting-Chao Chou, Drug Combination Studies and Their Synergy
Quantification Using the Chou-Talalay Method, 70 CANCER RSCH. 440 (2010).

2021]

DIFFERENTIAL ETIOLOGY

903

a population, such a relationship is considered synergistic. However, from an
etiologic perspective, where multiplicative models are most commonly employed,
the effect of each factor is diminished in the presence of the other.190
Noel Weiss provides an example of this type of situation in his discussion
of the relationship between estrogen use and endometrial cancer in the situation
where an individual is or is not obese. Obesity is a risk factor for this form of cancer
that is unrelated to the use of estrogen. He presents the following hypothetical data.
Postmenopausal
Estrogen Use
Never

Current ≥ 5
years

Risk
Difference

Relative
Risk
(Risk
Ratio)

Obesity

No

50

200

150

4

Yes

150

300

150

2

Risk
Difference

100

100

3

1.5

Relative
Risk
(Risk
Ratio)

Figure 2: Annual Incidence of Endometrial Cancer per 100,000 Women,
by Obesity and History of Estrogen Use191
These data illustrate an additive model, meaning that (a) the increases in
cancer incidence from both obesity and estrogen use do not depend on whether the
other risk factor is present or absent, and thus (b) the increase in incidence among
women with both risk factors from the incidence among those with neither (here,
300 − 50 = 250 per 100,000 women) is the sum of the increases associated with each
individually in the absence of the other (here, 150 + 100 = 250, the same result). In
contrast, in a multiplicative model, the ratio of the incidences in those with to those
without each risk factor is unaffected by the presence or absence of the other, and
the risk ratio among those with both relative to those with neither is the product of
risk ratios of each individually (here, 4 × 3 = 12). Thus, if the same risk factors
combined multiplicatively, in contrast to the table above, one would expect an
incidence rate of 12 × 50 = 600 cases per 100,000 among women with both, twice
the expected incidence in the additive model and an increment of (600−50) =

190.
INT’L AGENCY FOR RSCH. ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH ORG., IARC
MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS, NO. 83, TOBACCO
SMOKE AND INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 913–19 (2004).
191.
Adapted from FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 23.46.
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550 or, equivalently, 4 (RR Estrogen) × 3 (RR Obesity) − 1 = 11 times the baseline
risk of 50 for patients who are neither obese nor estrogen users.
For the additive model to apply, as in the table above, the presence of each
factor must attenuate the relative risk of the other. In the hypothetical data this
attenuation is by exactly half, from 4.0 to 2.0 for obesity and 3.0 to 1.5 for estrogen.
If nothing else, this example and the asbestos–smoking example indicate that the
use of general-causation epidemiologic data to resolve specific-causation issues can
become complicated very quickly. The examples raise several specific-causation
issues. When an individual has another risk factor that independently causes the
same disease, what role should the joint effect of these factors play in assessing
specific causation? There is no one clearly correct answer. One aspect of the
problem emerges when comparing the asbestos–smoking and the hypothetical
estrogen–obesity examples. In the former, substantially more than half the cases
among those exposed to both are apparently due to the joint exposure, and one may
conclude that for anyone jointly exposed who develops lung cancer it is more likely
than not that their illness is due to the joint exposure (36/50).192 However, this is not
the case in the estrogen–obesity example. The “joint risk” is not the more-likelythan-not cause of the injury. Therefore, one approach would be to look at each
independent risk separately.
If an obese individual experiences a doubling of the risk from taking
estrogen, should this resolve the specific-causation question in favor of the
plaintiff?193 If we compare the individual with other obese individuals who did not
take estrogen, the answer is yes. Taking estrogen doubled risk. But one could argue
that obesity is a greater risk factor than estrogen use. How should we view obesity?
A variation on the above example that is similar to our earlier two-pill example in
which obesity is replaced by another drug, Drug X, helps to address this question.
Here, Drug X is clearly a competing cause of endometrial cancer. From a
specific-causation perspective and looking at each risk factor alone, it is more likely
that estrogen use caused the injury of a person that took both drugs, and thus a
lawsuit against a Drug X defendant should fail. Should we treat obesity and Drug X
similarly, that is, treat both as competing causes? Should we treat all risk factors we
can calculate as competing causes? As a matter of risk alone, this is an appropriate
approach. However, one may ask whether legally we should treat every background
risk such as obesity as a competing cause. The answer to this question is as much a
matter of policy as it is of risk. We discuss cases that deal with the issue below.194

192.
That is, of the total 49-fold increment, 9-fold is due to smoking and 4-fold to
asbestos exposure. The remaining 36-fold increment is attributable to their joint occurrence.
193.
Again, we emphasize that this discussion assumes that there are not significant
internal- and external-validity problems with the research in question.
194.
Many of these cases wrestle with the even more complex question of how to
deal with situations where the individual has multiple foreground and background risk factors.
The above example presents a multiple-risk-factor situation if we reintroduce obesity along
with Drug X and estrogen as a third risk.
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Postmenopausal
Estrogen Use
Never

Current ≥ 5
years

Risk
Difference

Relative
Risk
(Risk Ratio)

Drug X

Never

50

200

150

4

Current ≥ 5
years

150

300

150

2

100

100

3

1.5

Risk
Difference
Relative
Risk
(Risk Ratio)

Figure 3: Annual Incidence of Endometrial Cancer Per 100,000 Women,
by Exposure to Drug X and History of Postmenopausal Estrogen Usage195
Assuming that a court does choose to treat either obesity or Drug X as a
potential cause of the plaintiff’s injury, how does this affect the specific-causation
inquiry? Absent a legal rule to the contrary, if the individual plaintiff must prove
that it is more likely than not that a risk factor is the cause of her injury, she will fail
if there is one or more competing-cause risk factors that have a stronger relationship
with the effect in question and where the joint effect of the risks is not greater than
each risk’s independent effect.196
In the Drug X and obesity examples, if they are viewed as competing
causes, the plaintiff cannot show that it is more likely than not that estrogen is the
cause of the cancer. Tort law, however, is somewhat ambiguous as to how we should
treat this case. Section 26 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harms adopts a but-for test of causation. It states, “Tortious conduct
must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual
cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct. Tortious
conduct may also be a factual cause of harm under § 27.”197
Comment e of § 26 contains the following passage that addresses the types
of situations presented in the preceding hypotheticals:
In some cases, two causal sets may exist, one or the other of which
was the cause of harm. Thus, for example, in a case in which the
plaintiff claims that a vaccination caused subsequent seizures, and
the defendant claims that the seizures were caused not by the
195.
Adapted from FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 11, § 23.46.
196.
In some cases, courts have admitted testimony and noted that the risk factor
under consideration has a stronger relationship with the effect than other known risk factors.
Cooper v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67, 79 (Ct. App. 2015).
197.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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vaccination, but by a preexisting traumatic injury to the plaintiff,
the causal set including the vaccination and the causal set
including the traumatic injury are such alternative causes. If
sufficient evidence to support each of these causal sets is
introduced, the factfinder will have to determine which one is
better supported by the evidence. On the other hand, if the
evidence revealed that a traumatic injury and a vaccination can
interact and cause seizures, then the vaccination and the trauma
may each be a factual cause (both elements of the causal set) of
the plaintiff’s seizures. Section 27 addresses the unusual case
where each of the causal sets is independently capable of causing
the harm and would have been a but-for cause if the other causal
set had not existed. This phenomenon is labeled in § 27 as
“multiple sufficient causes.” Section 27 provides a standard for
identifying additional factual causes in this circumstance.
Section 27 states, “If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone
would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence
of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”198 Does this
section apply to situations such as that described in the obesity or the Drug X
hypothetical?
A narrow reading of § 27 and the comments accompanying the section
suggest that the answer is no. Comment e to § 27 distinguishes between multiple
sufficient causes (e.g., the two-fire situation) and alternative causes, as follows:
In some cases, a defendant may contend that the acts of another
were the cause of the plaintiff’s harm and thus that defendant’s
tortious conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Whether
that claim implicates the rule in this Section depends on whether
the other forces were operating and sufficient to cause the harm
contemporaneously with the defendant’s tortious conduct or,
alternatively, were the factual cause of the harm instead of the
defendant’s tortious conduct. If the evidence supports the former
finding, then this Section is applicable. If the evidence supports
the latter finding, then the applicable standard for factual
causation is that stated in § 26.199

198.
Id. § 27. The origin of the rule in § 27 is the problem presented in what are
commonly called the “two fire” cases. A forest fire negligently started by person A to the
northeast of the plaintiff’s house merges with a fire negligently started by person B to the
northwest of the plaintiff’s house. The combined fire burns down the plaintiff’s house. Under
the generally applied but-for causation, but for the defendant’s negligent act, the plaintiff
would not have been injured, and the plaintiff must prove this by a preponderance of the
evidence (more likely than not). So, the plaintiff sues A. But A says you cannot prove but-for
causation because even if my fire had never existed, B’s fire would have burned down your
house, and in fact this is true. And of course, a suit against B produces the same answer in
reverse. What to do? The law’s answer is to resolve the causal problem with the § 27
exception to the § 26 rule.
199.
Id. § 27 cmt. e.
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The contemporaneous requirement and the “instead of” in this comment
may be understood to restrict the application of § 27 to situations like the two-fire
scenario in footnote 198. Given this interpretation, most courts would refuse to apply
§ 27 to most specific-causation situations. However, an illustration immediately
following the language quoted above creates some uncertainty as to which toxic-tort
situations might fall within the scope of § 27. It reads:
Trent is the guardian ad litem and father of Lakeesha, an infant
born with a birth defect. Trent sues Pharmco, a pharmaceutical
company, alleging both that Pharmco’s drug caused Lakeesha’s
birth defect and that Pharmco was negligent for its failure to warn
that its drug was teratogenic. Trent introduces sufficient evidence
for the factfinder to find that Pharmco’s failure to warn was
negligent, that the drug was a cause of Lakeesha’s birth defect,
and that an adequate warning would have prevented the birth
defect. Pharmco contends that its drug did not cause Lakeesha’s
birth defect. Rather, Pharmco contends, Lakeesha’s birth defect
was caused by a genetic condition wholly independent of
Pharmco’s drug. Pharmco introduces sufficient evidence in
support of its claims. The factfinder must determine if the drug,
absent Lakeesha’s genetic condition, would have caused the birth
defect. The factfinder must also determine if, absent the drug,
Lakeesha’s genetic condition would have caused the birth defect.
If the factfinder determines that either the drug or the genetic
condition would have, in the absence of the other, caused
Lakeesha’s birth defect at the same time then each is a factual
cause pursuant to this Section. If the factfinder determines that
either the drug or the genetic condition played no role in the birth
defect, then the other’s causal status is determined under the butfor standard of § 26.200
This illustration suggests that there could be some two-cause situations
where § 27 does apply. The outcome turns, it appears, on how one chooses to
understand the terms “at the same time” and “wholly independent of.” The “wholly
independent of” language presents a particularly high barrier if we understand it to
require that two substances, such as exist in the Drug X example, must produce the
same injury by two completely independent mechanistic pathways once they enter
the individual’s body. Unfortunately, it is currently beyond our ability to map these
pathways, but what we do know about some diseases, such as cancer, is that they
involve multiple mutations affecting a number of genes.201
The adoption of a § 27 position would mean that in cases where the relative
risk of an injury exceeds 2.0 among individuals sharing the plaintiff’s
characteristics, the way most courts describe the differential-etiology task is
incorrect. Courts describe the process of differential etiology as an effort to “rule
out” all causes other than the putative cause asserted by the plaintiff. But under §
27, if the putative cause has a relative risk greater than 2.0 (with valid research
200.
201.

Id. § 27, cmt. e, illus. 2.
See Gold, supra note 91.
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literature underlying it), it doesn’t matter if other causes are present, even if they
have high relative risks. When multiple sufficient causes are present in the plaintiff’s
case, therefore, the ultimate issue is not whether the putative cause more likely than
not was the cause-in-fact of the condition. Instead, the test asks whether the
substance in question more likely than not is sufficient to cause the condition, even
in the presence of other causes that might have been equally likely, or more likely,
to be the cause-in-fact. As long as the relative risk is greater than 2.0, the research
meets adequate internal-validity standards, and the plaintiff’s condition is
represented by the research (i.e., external validity), the expert testimony would be
admissible without more.202
We do not know of any opinions that explicitly adopt this position. Perhaps,
however, this is not surprising because we have not uncovered any opinions that
refuse to adopt the § 27 position where it is clear that the relative risk of the cause
in question is unarguably greater than 2.0, but there are competing causes that
present an even greater risk. The obvious place to find such cases would be plaintiffs
with lung cancer suing a defendant that had exposed them to a substantial dose of
asbestos where the record shows that the plaintiff was a long-time smoker. However,
we are aware of no cases where the court has excluded asbestos expert testimony on
these grounds.203 The absence of such cases suggests that when courts are presented
with two competing causes, each of which by itself poses a relative risk greater than
2.0, they may be reluctant to absolve the cause posing the lesser risk on specificcausation grounds.204
The significance of this observation should not be underestimated. The
gravamen of differential etiology is to identify the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s
202.
Similar ambiguity exists in jurisdictions that continue to use a “substantial
factor” test for causation. Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1246
(M.D. Fla. 2009). Take the following example from Florida:
Florida’s concurring cause rules are, at best, unsettled. In particular, it is
unclear whether, as [Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So.2d 14,
19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)] states, the “substantial factor” test applies
“only in those concurring cause cases where each of the said concurring
causes could have alone produced the plaintiff’s injury,” or whether, as
Florida Standard Jury Instruction 5.1(b) and the preexisting condition
cases cited above can be read to suggest, causation is satisfied where the
plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s negligence substantially
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, even though such negligence was one
of perhaps many concurring causes that acted in combination to cause the
injury.
203.
There are cases where a court has permitted tobacco defendants to introduce
evidence of plaintiff’s asbestos exposure. See, e.g., Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362
F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2004). Another place one might find such rulings would be in cases where
the plaintiff simultaneously sued asbestos and tobacco defendants. Surprisingly, such cases
are quite rare, sometimes because courts have held that such joinder is impermissible. See
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Stidham, 141 A.3d 1, 12–14 (Md. 2016) (overruling cases that
hold such joinder is never permissible),
204.
In the asbestos–tobacco situation, allowing such testimony could be justified
by the argument presented above that the joint effect of asbestos and tobacco exposure creates
a risk greater than the risk posed by either exposure in the absence of the other. However, no
court has ever actually adopted this approach.
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injury by ruling in the plaintiff’s claimed cause and ruling out alternative causes. If,
for instance, the plaintiff’s claimed Cause X has a relative risk of 2.1, but the plaintiff
was exposed to Cause Y with a relative risk of 20, then other things being equal Y
would appear to be more incriminated as the actual cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s
condition. However, if a court allows proof of Cause X in such cases to go to the
jury—as appears to be the practice in some areas—it is eschewing differential
etiology as an evidentiary threshold matter when the plaintiff’s proof is adequate to
conclude that his or her claimed cause, when considered in isolation, would be
sufficient to double the risk of injury, even if it is not more likely than not the actual
cause of the injury in the case at hand. Hence, judging by what appears to be the
current practice in asbestos–smoking cases, and perhaps contrary to conventional
understanding, differential etiology is only relevant when the plaintiff’s proof falls
below a relative risk of 2.0, is based on less-than-sound research literature, or no
relative risk is available because of the absence of epidemiological research. Cases
where there are multiple risk factors—and the risk being litigated does not have
relative risks greater than 2.0—generally parallel the In re Lipitor opinion
mentioned at the beginning of this Article.205 Recall that the plaintiff, Ms. Jones,
alleged that the drug, taken to control cholesterol levels, caused her diabetes. The
court excluded her specific-causation expert because studies indicate the relative
risk associated with taking the drug is less than 2.0. The court also noted that the
plaintiff was overweight with a body mass index of nearly 28 at the time she was
diagnosed with diabetes. 206 In addition, she suffered from hypertension, and her
family had some history of diabetes. All of these are risk factors for diabetes207 as is
age by itself. 208 Several of them appear to have a relative risk associated with
contracting diabetes substantially greater than the relative risk associated with taking
Lipitor.209 In this situation, and if the objective is to find the cause of the plaintiff’s
injury to the exclusion of other possible causes, it is difficult—if not impossible—
for the plaintiff to demonstrate that Lipitor is more likely than not the cause of her
205.
In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
150 F. Supp. 3d 644, 649–51 (D.S.C. 2015), aff’d, 892 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018).
206.
Id. at 648.
207.
The court refers to an American Journal of Epidemiology article based on the
well-regarded Nurses’ Health Study that found women with a body mass index (“BMI”) of
25 to 26.9 had more than a five-fold increased risk of diabetes compared to women with a
body mass index below 22.14. Yan Zheng et al., Group-Based Trajectory of Body Shape from
Ages 5 to 55 Years and Cardiometabolic Disease Risk in 2 U.S. Cohorts, 186 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1246 (2017). In addition, adult weight gain independent of BMI increases the
risk of diabetes. The Nurses’ Health Study found a weight gain in the range experienced by
the plaintiff, adjusted for BMI, was associated a two-fold increase in the risk of diabetes. Id.
208.
Age as a risk factor puts a fine point on the question of whether background
causes are treated as competing causes. Age, of course, is a surrogate for other biological
processes that change as we age. It is, therefore, a risk factor for many ailments.
209.
Speaking of plaintiff’s expert, the court noted:
[S]he has quantified the relative risk due to Lipitor as 1.6 and has admitted
that studies have shown the relative risk of other factors were much higher.
For example, Ms. Hempstead’s BMI gave her a relative risk over 5.0, her
total adult weight gain gave her a relative risk of 12.0, and her
hypertension gave her a relative risk of 1.76.
In re Lipitor, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 656–57.
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diabetes. But we should recognize that at present this task is beyond anyone. What
is clear is that cumulatively other risk factors far outweigh the apparent effect of
Lipitor. When this is the situation, many courts are prepared to exclude plaintiff’s
proffered expert testimony.
Sometimes the existence of other known potential causes offers another
approach to dealing with situations when epidemiologic studies suggest general
causation with a relative risk less than 2.0. This is the case because the estimated
relative risk between a particular factor and an injury typically is “marginal;” that
is, it is averaged over populations among which individual reactions to exposures
may vary, and there may be evidence distinguishing the plaintiff’s sensitivity to the
exposure from an average relative risk reported in the epidemiologic studies. 210
Again, when competing causes act as effect modifiers, they may prove useful in the
specific-causation analysis.
Effect modifiers may come in several forms. Sometimes, the addition of
another factor may work to the benefit of the plaintiff’s specific-causation argument.
For example, the plaintiff may be more sensitive to a specific exposure. 211
Biomarkers of greater sensitivity may help an individual to show that it is more
likely than not that a substance caused her injury.212 As the NAT2 gene variation
and breast-cancer example indicates, the relative risk of an injury following an
exposure may vary depending on an individual’s specific genetic makeup. The
NAT2 example and the Weiss and Drug X hypotheticals underline an intuitive point
that whenever there is an ability to specify subgroups within a study and then
calculate relative risks for a subgroup of at least moderate sample size, this leads to
a more valid estimate of the risk of an exposure —in the sense that it is less subject
to external-validity concerns—for a given individual who can be placed in the
relevant subgroup. Interestingly, and more subtly, this may also be so even when the
individual cannot be placed in a specific subgroup with certainty. 213 Exposure
210.
For a case discussing this possibility, see Estate of George v. Vermont League
of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367 (Vt. 2010).
211.
Some variation is the result of differential absorption. For example, iron
deficiency, which is more likely among disadvantaged children, increases the rate of
absorption of ingested lead. The rate of metabolic processes also may vary across individuals.
Slower metabolic processes among older people may alter the rate of elimination of a toxin.
212.
Earlier we cited Kirk v. Schaeffler Group USA, Inc., 887 F.3d 376, 391 (8th
Cir. 2018) for a case where the plaintiff’s expert testified to the plaintiff’s genetic
predisposition that caused her to develop autoimmune hepatitis (“AIH”) as a result of
exposure to defendant’s trichloroethylene.
213.
A. Philip Dawid, The Role of Scientific and Statistical Evidence in Assessing
Causality, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 133–47 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011). The point
is made by the following example (slightly edited from the original):
Suppose that scientific research has identified a gene with two variants, G and
N, each present in 50% of the population. It has been found that, among those having variant
G, the headache recovery rate (within 30 minutes) if untreated is 24%, but because of an
interaction with the action of aspirin, such an individual will never recover from a headache
if treated with aspirin. As for those with variant N, they never recover if left untreated but
have a 60% chance of recovery if they take aspirin. Over the whole population (ignoring
genetic status), the recovery rate is 30% with aspirin and 12% without aspirin. Using only
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biomarkers may also play a role. For example, the absence of a high-validity
biomarker of exposure to a rival cause of an individual’s illness offers some
evidence excluding this alternative cause.214
As useful as it may be in some situations, the subgroup solution comes with
its own limitations. Subgroup data are always less plentiful, and hence estimated
relative risks in subgroups are generally substantially less precise than overall
estimates. Thus, even though subgroup estimates may be less biased than overall
(crude) estimates, in any particular instance they may well depart further from the
truth due to increased random variation. This sample-size limitation quickly
becomes decisive when we contemplate multiple competing causes as in the Lipitor
these overall figures, given that I took the aspirin and recovered, the lower bound on the
probability of causation (“PC”) is 60%.
However, with the additional scientific knowledge of the gene, given that I did
recover after taking aspirin, it can be inferred that I cannot be of type G, so I must be N; and
it then follows that I would certainly not have recovered if I had not taken the aspirin. So,
with this extra scientific knowledge we can deduce PC = 1 – a major improvement on
(although of course consistent with) the “black-box” conclusion PC ≥ 60%.)
In more typical cases, such scientific knowledge of background attributes will
not fully determine any outcome. Nevertheless, even for a case where we do not know the
background attributes, we can still use that scientific knowledge to obtain an improvement in
the lower bound for PC (though not now to 1). A formula for this is given in the cited article.
214.
Stout & Valberg, supra note 62, at 802. The probative value of the absence of
a marker depends on the marker’s sensitivity and specificity. In this context, sensitivity
measures how often the marker is present in individuals known to have been exposed.
Specificity measures how often the marker is absent in persons known not to have been
exposed.
One must not fall into the trap of concluding that the existence of a biomarker
of exposure can resolve the specific-causation question. The existence of a biomarker does
not rule out the possibility that some other substance or exposure caused the individual’s
injury. Moreover, the markers we do have are rarely very specific or sensitive. Most toxins
or their metabolites are thought to produce illness by multiple pathways, and many pathways
are thought to be shared by multiple toxins. Moreover, epigenetic effects—that is, effects of
factors that regulate the expression of genes—further complicate the interpretation of a
genetic biomarker.
To illustrate the difficulty in finding biomarkers that are highly specific and
highly sensitive, consider again the connection between benzene exposure and leukemia.
Studies have found chromosomal aberrations that sometimes occur in leukemia patients with
known occupational benzene exposure, but they also occur in leukemia patients in the control
groups of these studies. Despite the progress in chromosomal and genetic study of leukemia
in people exposed to benzene, the search for a signature biomarker of exposure continues.
And even if we do discover such a marker, this, by itself does not rule out the possibility that
some other exposure or some genetic factor caused the individual’s illness. As is true with
epidemiological associations, the level of reliance one should place on biomarker research
turns on questions of validity, consistency, specificity, coherence, and biological plausibility.
Some greater headway has been made with respect to showing a genetic rather than a toxic
source of an injury. This was the case in Deribeaux ex rel. Deribeaux v. Secretary of Health
& Human Services, 717 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), where the government was able to show
that the claimant’s SCN1A gene mutation rather than the Diphtheria–Tetanusacellular
Pertussis (“DTaP”) vaccine was the sole substantial cause of Deribeaux’s seizure disorder
and developmental delays.
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case, where other risk factors included age, weight, hypertension, and a family
history of diabetes. Moreover, in complex situations such as this we may know little
more than that the absolute risk for someone with all these factors is greater than the
absolute risk for those individuals with only one risk factor.215
Thus, to date, the analysis of how competing causes influence each other
has been relatively unsophisticated. It remains to be seen whether advances in
causal-inference methods may at some time in the future enhance our ability to
address these complex relationships.
2. The Problem of Idiopathic Causes
Cases where a large percentage of injuries are the result of unknown causes
present a similar but even more difficult admissibility problem for plaintiffs.216 All
diseases have some unknown—or in medical terms, “idiopathic”—causes, if for no
other reason than a failure to discover an exposure to a known cause. This fact seems
to be ignored in most situations. Below we discuss some cases in which a substantial
majority of injuries of the relevant type occur due to unknown causes and where
courts have excluded expert differential-diagnosis opinions on these grounds.
The rather well-known case of Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products
Group, Inc. ultimately turned on this issue. The plaintiff had prevailed on the
general-causation issue of whether benzene exposure can cause the plaintiff’s rare
form of Acute Myeloid Leukemia (“AML”).217 On remand, the trial court noted that
between 70 and 80 percent of AML cases are idiopathic. In light of this fact, it made

215.
There is one more point about the Lipitor opinion worth mentioning. The
plaintiff’s expert opined that even if Lipitor did not “cause” the plaintiff’s injury in the “but
for” sense—that if the plaintiff had not taken Lipitor she would never have become diabetic—
it caused the plaintiff to develop the disease earlier than would otherwise have occurred.
Regardless of the merits of the argument on these facts, it is a version of a “promotion”
argument. The same argument was made in Haller v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, 598
F. Supp. 2d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2009). The plaintiff’s expert testified, “Now, ask me to take
away Seroquel, well, it would still have happened, but it may not have happened until many
years later, ma’am.” Id. at 1288–89. A similar argument also appeared in the Joiner case.
If in fact the promotion argument is correct, it poses additional problems of
specific causation. As Greenland notes, if a promotion (or, as he calls it, an “acceleration”)
argument is correct, then the relative risk in a study underestimates the probability that
exposure accelerated the occurrence of an injury. See Sander Greenland, Relation of
Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error That
Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (1999). Other statistical methods
must be brought to bear to analyze this argument. Survival models explicitly model
acceleration (i.e., promotion) or retardation by expanding or shrinking the time scale. See
DAVID W. HOSMER, JR. ET AL., APPLIED SURVIVAL ANALYSIS: REGRESSION MODELING OF
TIME-TO-EVENT DATA (2d ed. 2008); HANDBOOK OF SURVIVAL ANALYSIS (John P. Klein et
al. eds., 2013).
216.
In this context, idiopathic risks are risks we simply do not know and also risks
that we know to exist but do not understand. An example of the latter is a general knowledge
that one’s genetic makeup influences the probability that exposure to a “cause” will produce
an effect in an individual but without any understanding of how this occurs.
217.
639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
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the following observation about the proffered testimony of the plaintiff’s specificcausation expert:
Here, even if Butler could rule out smoking and obesity as
probable causes, the differential diagnosis analysis provides little
information. When a disease has a discrete set of causes,
eliminating some number of them significantly raises the
probability that the remaining option or options were the causein-fact of the disease. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot.
Harm § 28, cmt. c (2010) (“The underlying premise [of
differential etiology] is that each of the [ ] known causes is
independently responsible for some proportion of the disease in a
given population. Eliminating one or more of these as a possible
cause for a specific plaintiff’s disease increases the probability
that the agent in question was responsible for that plaintiff’s
disease.”). The same cannot be said when eliminating a few
possible causes leaves not only fewer possible causes but also a
high probability that a cause cannot be identified. (“When the
causes of a disease are largely unknown . . . differential etiology
is of little assistance.”). Butler cannot establish specific causation
in this context using a differential diagnosis approach.218
Other cases reaching a similar result include Doe v. Ortho-Clinical
Diagnostics, Inc.,219 Hall v. Conoco Inc.,220 Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co.,221
Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc.,222 and Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.223
Two things are worth noting about these cases. First, in none of these cases
is there group data suggesting even a doubling of risk of the injury in question among
those exposed to the substance.224 In most of these cases (Doe, Hall, and Kilpatrick),
there is in fact little or no data on general causation. In Hall and Milward, the
plaintiff had very little data on dosage, which apparently was low.225 Second, in the

218.
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 101, 109 (D.
Mass. 2013). Even in the face of this high percentage of idiopathic illnesses, the court stated
that it would have admitted the expert’s testimony had there been data on a threshold of
harmful exposure, but apparently the expert simply argued that there is no safe threshold. The
district court opinion was affirmed by Milward v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 820 F.3d 469, 471, 477
(1st Cir. 2016).
219.
440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477–78 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
220.
886 F.3d 1308, 1314 (10th Cir. 2018).
221.
605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
222.
613 F.3d 1329, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2010).
223.
564 F. Supp. 2d 452, 471 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
224.
Thus, even were a court willing to adopt a multiple causal set analysis as
discussed above, these cases would not benefit from such an analysis.
225.
The relative risks associated with low doses of benzene and Acute Myeloid
Leukemia tend to be well below 2.0. See Abdul Khalade et al., Exposure to Benzene at Work
and the Risk of Leukemia: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 9 ENV’T HEALTH 31
(2010); Martha S. Linet et al., Benzene Exposure Response and Risk of Myeloid Neoplasms
in Chinese Workers: A Multicenter Case-Cohort Study, 111(5) J. Nat’l Cancer Inst. 465
(2019).
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majority of known cases, the substantial majority of injuries are attributed to
idiopathic causes. Therefore, there is no way for the plaintiff to differentiate herself
from other individuals. A subgroup analysis is rarely possible. In this regard, Perry
is a particularly interesting case. In Perry, the plaintiffs claimed their child’s T-cell
lymphoblastic lymphoma (T-LBL) (a type of non-Hodgkin lymphoma) was caused
by her use of Elidel, a prescription cream used to treat eczema. The court excluded
plaintiff’s experts in part because they could not rule out idiopathic causes of the
disease.
The opinion contains a discussion of what an expert must do in the
circumstance where most occurrences of a disease are from unknown causes, as is
the case with T-LBL. Pimecrolimus is the active ingredient in Elidel and is one of a
class of drugs known as calcineurin inhibitors. Calcineurin inhibitors are known to
inhibit immune-system function. Other calcineurin inhibitors are used in
immunosuppressive therapy to prevent rejection after organ transplants and have
been associated with increased incidence of post-transplant lymphoproliferative
disorder, an illness similar to non-Hodgkin lymphoma. All of this strengthens the
plaintiff’s general-causation argument by presenting evidence that tends to refute
the existence of a merely idiopathic origin.
When plaintiff’s experts were questioned about how they excluded “no
known cause” in the child’s illness, they simply repeated the existence of a known
risk factor, primecrolimus. The court responded: “Standing alone, the presence of a
known risk factor is not a sufficient basis for ruling out idiopathic origin in a
particular case, particularly where most cases of the disease have no known
cause.”226
However, the trial judge did not leave the matter here. Rather he went on
to make the following comment:
This is not to say that where most diagnoses of a disease are
idiopathic it is impossible to prove specific causation. But in those
cases, analysis beyond a differential diagnosis will likely be
required. Here, for example, because lymphoma caused by
immunosuppressant drugs is well-understood, Drs. Smith and
Kolb could have compared the presentation of Andreas Perry’s
symptoms with those common in post-transplant lymphoma
cases. Doing so, however, would not have served plaintiffs’
purposes.227
The court explained this last sentence by noting that the post-transplant
cancers have a history consistent with B-cell origin, whereas the child’s lymphoma
had a T-cell origin. Moreover, the post-transplant lymphomas occur, on average, 4.2
years after the transplant, with the earliest-known presentation occurring 1.7 years
after transplant. The disease in this case was detected less than seven months after
the child’s first exposure to Elidel. These facts make the district court’s task
somewhat easier, as it would appear the features of this child’s cancer were

226.
227.

Perry, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
Id.
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dissimilar to those of other cancers accepted as caused by immunosuppression.228
However, if the illness had a B-cell origin and had occurred at the appropriate time
after the initiation of Elidel, the plaintiff’s case on specific causation would have
been much stronger. In terms of Bradford Hill indicia, such mechanistic evidence
can assist a plaintiff by providing evidence of specificity, plausibility, and
coherence.229
Unfortunately, for the other cases listed above there is no known distinction
between forms of a disease, and a court must decide if the simple failure to exclude
idiopathic causes is reason for exclusion of expert testimony when in fact there is no
way to exclude (or prove) idiopathic causes. In the absence of some toxicological or
genetic data that can more particularly describe an injury, the idiopathic-injury cases
present unique difficulties. By definition, there are no known risks we might control
for by a more refined analysis of group data.230
Given this state of affairs, perhaps it is reasonable for courts to disregard
idiopathic causes in those cases where idiopathic causes comprise a relatively small
percent of all injuries.231
3. Lack of Human, Especially Epidemiological Data
A final category of cases presenting difficult admissibility questions are
those where there are no epidemiologic, clinical-trial, or other group-level human
data.232 Cases where there are no relevant human-based data include injuries that are
the result of a sporadic accident,233 where ethical considerations bar research, or
228.
The task was also made easier because the plaintiff faced a significant dose
(i.e., general causation) problem.
229.
The lack of mechanism evidence may have the opposite effect. See Guinn v.
AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
230.
See Faigman and Mnookin, supra note 37, at 628 for a discussion of a case
that apparently ignored the fact that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from unknown causes
approximately three-fourths of the time.
231.
It is difficult to set a specific percentage of idiopathic causes that defeat a
specific-causation analysis. Suppose idiopathic cases account for 40%, cause A for 35%, and
cause B for 25% of cases of a disease. Neglecting idiopathic causes fundamentally alters the
probability that A is the cause from 35% to 58.33%. However, the effect of disregarding
idiopathic causes depends in part on the relative importance of other competing causes.
Inevitably, setting such a percentage is partly a question of policy. At least one court has
simply set aside the whole issue of idiopathic causes, arguing that “[m]edicine partakes of art
as well as science” and that “district courts should typically admit specific-causation opinions
that lean strongly toward the ‘art’ side of the spectrum.” In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig.,
358 F. Supp. 3d 956, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2019). This, of course, is fundamentally a retreat to a
Frye-like rule.
232.
We should note at the outset that this does not mean there are no human data.
Depending on the case, the plaintiff may have a biomarker of exposure or other individuallevel evidence. This category is intended to include only those cases where there are no
human-based group data on causation.
233.
Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content
of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 181, 188 (1993).
These cases point to an underlying fact that proof of causation in one person is contingent on
the existence of similarly exposed individuals. The first plaintiff (or the sole plaintiff)
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where the research lags the litigation.234 Courts consistently assert that the absence
of epidemiologic evidence is not inevitably fatal to a plaintiff’s proof of general
causation.235 But rarely do they then permit a plaintiff to proceed to trial. As we
discussed above, in part this is because in many cases where there are no
epidemiological or other human data, there often are significant general-causation
issues and many of these cases are disposed of on general-causation grounds.
In the absence of human data, courts are most open to an expert’s generalcausation testimony when it is based on animal research. Few cases permit the expert
to express a general-causation opinion based solely on in vitro research or on case
reports.236
When the general-causation testimony is ruled admissible, the plaintiff still
must offer admissible specific-causation testimony.237 A number of factors affect
experiencing an exposure may find it much more difficult to prove causation than other, later
plaintiffs who have a body of epidemiology and animal research to support their claims.
234.
Schott v. I-Flow Corp., 696 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(conducting epidemiological studies would be unethical.)
235.
See Ruff v. Ensign-Bickford Indus., Inc. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (D. Utah
2001); In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Schott,
696 F. Supp. 2d at 905; Jones v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1269 (N.D.
Ala. 2017).
236.
The Bradford Hill plus indicia help us to understand why. External-validity
concerns alone are often sufficient. In addition, there are often specificity problems based on
level of exposure (e.g., dose), similarity between types of injury (e.g., different types of
cancer), and the absence of biological gradient information.
Graham v. Playtex Products, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) is a case
that admitted such testimony. The Graham court allowed plaintiff’s experts to testify that all
cotton tampons are less likely to cause toxic shock syndrome (“TSS”) than tampons
containing rayon based solely on their in vitro research. Apparently, there was not a body of
epidemiological data concerning their relative safety. The plaintiff’s experts themselves seem
to concede, however, that once such evidence became available, it would be inappropriate to
base an opinion on the in vitro data. Id. at 131.
Most courts, however, are skeptical of causation testimony based solely on
such evidence. See In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 1291,
1310 (N.D. Fla. 2018); In re Accutane Prods. Liab., 511 F. Supp. 2d, 1288, 1294–95 (M.D.
Fla. 2007); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1340-44 (11th Cir. 2010). However, as
with animal studies, in vitro data may be used to supplement other types of evidence, provided
the expert explains how the in vitro data can be reliably extrapolated to predict a drug’s effects
in humans.
There are some cases that are clearly wrongly decided. See Bee v. Novartis
Pharms. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (apparently permitting an expert to
offer a causation opinion based on case reports alone). Even in the absence of epidemiology,
most courts would not permit a plaintiff’s expert to base a causal opinion on case reports. See
also Meister v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Wells v.
SmithKlineBeecham Corp., 601 F.3d. 375, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2010).
237.
In a number of cases in this category, the court rejects the plaintiff’s specificcausation opinion only after previously rejecting the general-causation evidence. Although
these cases may find flaws in the specific-causation opinion, i.e., it failed to rule out other
causes, the ruling was superfluous once general-causation testimony was excluded. Trial
courts engage in this additional analysis presumably in order to reduce the chance of a reversal
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the willingness of courts to admit such testimony. The Bradford Hill indicia again
offer some guidance. The strength of a relationship remains an important
consideration. However, measuring strength is not quite a straightforward
enterprise. It turns in part on the dosage necessary to induce an injury in another
species and how close this dose is to plausible human exposure levels. Plaintiffs who
have experienced substantial exposures may more easily demonstrate specific
causation. Consistent injuries across several nonhuman species bolsters a causal
interpretation for humans as well, and this is especially the case if toxicologic and
genetic evidence suggests a similar pathway of injury across species. Such evidence
is also relevant to the indicium of biological plausibility.
Specificity is another useful indicium. Recall that in the Joiner case, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that the mice in an animal study suffered from a different
cancer than the plaintiff, and their exposure came through a different pathway (PCBs
injected into the mice versus dermally absorbed by the plaintiff). This lack of
similarity argues against the validity of the animal study to prove that the plaintiff’s
injury was due to exposure to PCBs.
Biological-gradient evidence by itself is not particularly important, but the
absence of any gradient over a broad dose range argues against causation.238 Of
course, temporal order alone may be quite persuasive when the harm nearly
immediately follows the exposure.239
It is important, however, not to overstate the ability of this type of evidence
to establish specific causation. When there is a substantial lag time between
exposure and injury, when the level of the plaintiff’s exposure is not especially great,

on appeal. See, e.g., Grant v. Pharmavite, LLC, 452 F. Supp. 2d 903 (D. Neb. 2006); Cloud
v. Pfizer Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2001); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605
F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
238.
Assuming there is a biological gradient (i.e., the greater the exposure, the more
likely it will result in a harm), high levels of exposure suggest a stronger relationship between
the substance and resulting harm. In this regard, Judge Calabresi’s opinion in Zuchowicz v.
United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) is instructive. In Zuchowicz, the plaintiff’s wife
died from a fatal lung condition allegedly caused by the drug Danocrine. Mrs. Zuchowicz was
negligently prescribed a substantial overdose of the drug, which she took daily for over a
month. She continued taking the correct dosage of the medication for another two months,
when, due to adverse symptoms, she was advised to cease. According to the plaintiff’s
experts, because of the rareness of primary pulmonary hypertension and the lack of any formal
research on the effects of the drug at this dose rate, they could not point to specific research
supporting their differential diagnosis that the drug caused the decedent’s illness. However,
they could point to other studies showing that agents such as birth-control pills, some appetite
suppressants, and chemotherapy drugs caused this illness. In support of the decision to affirm
the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony, Judge Calabresi stated that the experts were
able to provide a biologically plausible reason why the drug could cause this effect. Id. at
387–90. In sum, the experts met a number of the Bradford Hill indicia of causation: strength,
analogy, plausibility, and temporality. For an interesting discussion of this case, see Kenneth
S. Abraham, Self-Proving Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811 (2013).
239.
See Marcum v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 193 P.3d 1 (Or. 2008); Tedder v.
Am. Railcar Indus., Inc. 739 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2014).
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and when other, competing causes are present, then proof of specific causation
remains very problematic in the absence of any group-level evidence.
4. Summary: Multiple Risk Factors and Individuating Circumstances
Situations where the individual has multiple risk factors or there is a high
percentage of idiopathic causes pose especially difficult specific-causation
problems. In the idiopathic situation, the variables that determine injury outcomes
are, by definition, poorly understood and cannot be controlled for. In situations
where the individual has many risk factors, non-epidemiologic research studies that
assist in determining general causation are less useful in demonstrating specific
causation. Many, such as animal studies, typically control for confounders by
experimental techniques that increase internal validity but often at the expense of
external validity. Consequently, they provide very limited information on the
relative impacts different factors may have on a plaintiff’s injury. Not surprisingly,
this situation often results in the exclusion of the plaintiff’s specific-causation
expert.240
The best way to get some purchase on specific causation in these cases is,
once again, to search for ways in which the plaintiff can be distinguished from
others. Here, once again, the Bradford Hill-specificity indicium is particularly
important. If available, the absence of biomarkers of exposure may be used to
eliminate other rival causes from consideration. Markers of illness may be useful in
the same way.241 Dose and level of exposure may also play a role. If a substance
exhibits a biological gradient, a very large dose increases the probability that the
substance in question was the cause of an injury because the larger dose increases
the strength of the relationship between the substance and the injury.242
Temporal order may also play a differentiating role. Sometimes the
individual may be “sick too soon” or “sick too late” for the substance in question to
have caused her injury. 243 But temporal order may be useful in reducing the
probability of other causes as well.
These far-from-exhaustive examples are intended to emphasize the many
ways that the Bradford Hill plus guidelines may assist us in unraveling the thorny
question of specific causation. While none of these approaches can resolve all
specific-causation issues, developing a coherent strategy for producing
differentiating evidence is essential if courts are to avoid falling back into a Fryelike tendency to admit expert specific-causation testimony in limited evidence
situations based solely on the ipse dixit of the expert.

240.
See Kolesar v. United Agri Prods., Inc., 246 Fed. App’x 977, 981 (6th Cir.
2007); Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 889 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2018).
241.
Recall the judge’s discussion in Perry v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 564
F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Pa. 2008). If the plaintiff’s lymphoma had a B-cell origin, this would
have bolstered the probability that his disease was associated with his eczema medication.
The fact that it did not increased the probability of some other unknown cause.
242.
Recall that this indicium played a role in Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d 381.
243.
The Perry case provides an example here as well. Recall that the plaintiff was
“sick too soon” for the eczema drug to have been the cause of his lymphoma. Perry, 564 F.
Supp. 2d at 470.
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V. SETTING THE STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY IS POLICY AS
WELL AS SCIENCE
The Bradford Hill and validity indicia can help courts understand and
articulate the grounds on which they admit or exclude expert evidence. It is
important to emphasize, however, that they cannot establish a fixed standard for
admissibility. The standard is, or at least should be, grounded in science. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, ipse dixit should not do.244 But how much evidence is
needed is also a question of policy. Policy considerations most clearly come to the
forefront in cases with little or no human data. Perhaps, therefore, it is not surprising
that this set of cases sometimes produce conflicting specific-causation admissibility
rulings.245 And it is this set of cases where some courts seem to be most likely to
admit expert-specific-causation testimony with limited scientific support.246
In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability Litigation
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings247 is a typical example. There, the court made the
following statement:
Specifically, AbbVie argues that plaintiffs’ experts were required
to quantify the risks posed by each alternative cause that they
could not definitively rule out. The Court disagrees that such
quantification is required to reliably conduct a reliable differential
etiology. It is true that where numerous causes of an injury are
plausible, an expert may not “simply pick [ ] the cause that is most
advantageous to [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Viterbo v. Dow Chem.
Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987). Quantifying the risks
posed by alternative causes is, of course, one way to establish that
a particular risk was a likely cause of the plaintiff’s injury. But
under Seventh Circuit law, in a case like this, the expert’s task is
244.
See Faigman & Mnookin, supra note 37, at 628. Especially when the scientific
record is thin, the fine line between legitimate inference from incomplete evidence and
inappropriate speculation and conjecture becomes both absolutely critical and particularly
challenging to navigate.
At least one academic, however, has argued for this ipse dixit approach by, for
example, permitting clinicians to testify as to their clinical judgement on specific causation.
See Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, The Causal Conundrum: Examining the Medical-Legal
Disconnect in Toxic Tort Cases from a Cultural Perspective or How the Law Swallowed the
Epidemiologist and Grew Long Legs and a Tail, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 319 (2018). For a
federal-court opinion that seems to come close to adopting this position, see In re Roundup
Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 3d 956, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
245.
Compare Messick v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2014),
Bee v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and Monroe v.
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1122 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (all admitting
testimony), with Garrison v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1339 (M.D. Ala.
2014) (excluding testimony).
246.
See Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 2943572,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2017).
247.
In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated
Pretrial Proc., No. 14 C 1748, 2017 WL 1833173, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017).
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to provide a reliable basis for concluding that the drug at issue was
a “substantial factor” in the development of the plaintiff’s injury
and that the other potential causes are unlikely to have been the
injury’s sole cause. Quantifying the risks of alternative causes is
not required.248
Because of the “group to individual” G2i problem 249 confronting all
specific-causation analyses, courts are confronted with a dilemma whenever there
are multiple causes of a plaintiff’s injury and there is no compelling quantitative
evidence permitting an expert to offer a more-likely-than-not opinion. This court,
and other courts have been reluctant to require the impossible from plaintiffs and
ask for the same level of proof of causation that they seek in most general-causation
inquiries or in many specific-causation inquiries where the data are more complete.
But they are also reluctant to adopt any of the proposals found in the literature that
call upon courts to abolish the specific-causation requirement altogether, to adopt
something other than a but-for test, or to give plaintiffs a percentage recovery when
the plaintiff cannot meet their burden of proof.250
The alternative is to lessen the level of justification required from an expert
before the expert is permitted to make a specific-causation claim.251 It is clear that
courts sometimes allow an expert to express a causation opinion with less
justification than they require for general causation. 252 When they do so they
implicitly or explicitly leaven scientific rigor with legal-process policy goals.253

248.
See also In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.
Supp. 2d 116, 156 (D. Mass. 2009); Adeghe v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 16 Civ. 2235, 2017 WL
3741310, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2017); Wendell, 858 F.3d at 1234. But see McMunn v.
Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 869 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2017) for a case
where the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to apply this approach in a radiation-exposure
situation.
249.
See supra note 2 (discussing the G2i problem).
250.
Although this last alternative may seem particularly attractive and has some
precedent in the loss-of-chance cases such as Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819
(Mass. 2008), it is only even theoretically possible in cases where there is valid epidemiologic
evidence sufficient to establish general causation. In all the cases where there is insufficient
epidemiology, there is no plausible way to arrive at a percentage that reflects the probability
that exposure to the defendant’s product caused the plaintiff’s injury.
251.
For a discussion of the level of justification required of an expert when making
a causal assertion, see Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72(1) L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2009).
252.
See, e.g., Messick v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 747 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir.
2014).
253.
See Nancy Gertner & Joseph Sanders, Alternatives to Traditional Adversary
Methods of Presenting Scientific Expertise in the Legal System, 147 DAEDALUS 135 (2018).
In this regard, the courts’ lower admissibility thresholds are similar to the lower threshold
courts have often employed in admitting state forensic evidence in criminal cases. David L.
Faigman, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of
Reasoning from General Scientific Data to Individualized Legal Decision Making, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 1115 (2010); Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual
Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367 (2010).
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Certainly, there is room for disagreement about how much evidence is
required before the court concludes that the expert has sufficiently justified her
conclusion. However, in this situation the reasoning of the court is just as important
as the result. What is unfortunate is that many courts—those that do admit testimony
based on limited evidence that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the defendant’s
substance—follow a path of least resistance embodied in the above Testosterone
Replacement Therapy Products Liability Litigation quote.254 They simply say that
some higher standard, e.g., quantifiable data, is not required but then fail to engage
in a serious discussion of the available evidence. Other opinions fall back on legal
nostrums such as the statement that differential diagnosis is a recognized
methodology, and therefore, testimony based on this methodology should be
admitted. 255 Or they rely on the bald statement that the plaintiff’s expert is not
required to exclude all alternative causes, even when there are quite plausible causes
that are not ruled out. Some opinions are so truncated and conclusory that it is not
even possible to assess the merits of the expert’s arguments to exclude other
causes.256 If it accomplishes nothing else, we hope this Article will encourage courts
to employ the analytical tools provided by the Bradford Hill indicia to write more
complete and cogent opinions justifying their ruling.
A second policy issue presents itself when a competing cause is by way of
a personal background risk, especially a risk over which the individual has no
control. From a scientific perspective, all risks are equal and work for or against
proof of specific causation regardless of whether they are caused by a responsible
agent. From a policy perspective, courts may choose not to treat some risk factors
as competing causes, perhaps because they are innate or other factors of which an
individual has little or no control or are otherwise in the range of normal human
variation and expression, which the defendant’s product would be expected to safely
accommodate. We noted this possibility in our discussion of the competing risk
factors of estrogen use and obesity.257

CONCLUSION
Assessing specific causation in toxic-tort cases is one of the most difficult
tasks confronting judges in a post-Daubert world. As a number of us have noted in
earlier articles, this is primarily because it presents a classic G2i problem, a search
for the causes of an effect rather than the effects of a cause. Because most available
science does not directly address this issue, experts are compelled to approach the

254.
See supra note 248.
255.
This type of reasoning is particularly likely to be found in Frye states (see
Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007); Walsh v. BASF Corp., 191 A.3d 838 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2018)), but occasionally appears in federal cases as well (see Johnson v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 754 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2014)).
256.
The number of cases that could be cited for this proposition is quite large. Here
are two recent examples. Note that they often are published only as slip opinions. See, e.g.,
McWilliams v. Novartis AG, No. 2:17-CV-14302-Rosenberg/Maynard, 2018 WL 3364617
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2018); Holder v. Interlake S.S. Co., 16-CV-343-wmc, 2018 WL 1725694,
at *17 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 10, 2018); Childress v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:12-CV-01564,
2017 WL 6350504, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 12, 2017).
257.
See supra p. 57.
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problem indirectly by attempting to eliminate possible competing causes of an
injury.
In this Article, we have discussed the evidence available to answer causal
questions in toxic-tort cases and reviewed how this evidence may be brought to bear
to answer the specific-causation question within the structure of current tort-law
rules. The Bradford Hill indicia have previously been useful to scientists and courts
in addressing the question of general causation. In this Article we hope we have
demonstrated that these same guidelines, supplemented by considerations of internal
and external validity, constitute a set of analytical tools that can enhance a court’s
ability to arrive at defensible and coherent specific-causation rulings. Unfortunately,
in the process we have demonstrated that a complete and well-informed differential
etiology is still often beyond our reach.

